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Disputes surrounding public education repeatedly take center stage in American 
life.  Public schooling serves as such a hotbed for controversy because of the deeply held 
and often conflicting interests and demands of parents, students, and the states and local 
communities who run public schools.   To name only a few recent disputes, this summer, 
the Miami-Dade County School Board banned a children’s book about life in Cuba after 
a Cuban-American parent complained that the book depicted Cuba in too positive a 
light.1 A federal district court later ordered the book returned to the shelves until the case 
goes to trial.2 This summer also saw the culmination of a contentious school board 
campaign in Kansas, in which a new majority on the state school board was elected on a 
platform to eliminate previously passed curriculum standards inspired by the theory of 
intelligent design.3 This was not the first such go-round on the issue in Kansas:  In 2000, 
after a creationist school board removed any mention of evolution from the state science 
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1 See Terry Aguayo, Miami-Dade School Board Bans Cuba Book, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A24. 
 
2 See ACLU of Florida, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County School Board, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50502 (2006); 
see also Terry Aguayo, National Briefing South: Florida: Judge Blocks Ban On Children’s Book, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2006) at A16.
3 See The Evolution of Kansas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2006, at A20; Lawrence Krauss, How to Make Sure 
Children are Scientifically Illiterate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at F3. 
2curriculum, the public outcry led to the election of a majority that reinstated evolution in 
the curriculum; this majority was ousted in 2004 by a board that passed standards 
associated with intelligent design.4 A similar oscillation is taking place in other states: 
Last February, the Ohio Board of Education reversed its requirement that high school 
biology classes critically analyze evolution.5 This reversal followed a federal district 
court’s ruling striking down the intelligent design curricula passed in Dover, 
Pennsylvania.  During this time, as well, a number of cases have been making their way 
through the courts in which parents assert that school funding violates state constitutional 
guarantees to provide students with a sound basic education that prepares them to 
participate in society.6
So who, ultimately, should control students’ education in public schools?  And, in 
the event of disagreement about what this task entails and how it should be accomplished, 
whose views should trump?  I argue here that in a liberal democracy, it is inevitable that 
there will be conflicts among parents, children, and the state’s interests with respect to 
education.  Given the legitimacy of claims by the community to have a say in how its 
future citizens should be educated; the equally legitimate claims of parents to have a say 
in how their own children should be educated; the need for children to develop the 
autonomy that liberalism demands; and the needs of the polity to ensure that children 
come to possess the civic virtues necessary to perpetuate a healthy liberal democracy, 
none of these interests can be allowed completely to dominate education in public 
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5 See Ralph Blumenthal, In Kansas, Evolution’s Backers Are Mounting a Counterattack, N.Y. TIMES, July 
29, 2006) at A1. 
 
6 See, e.g., Leandro v. State of North Carolina, 346 N.C. 336 (1997), later proceeding sub. nom. Hoke 
County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358 N.C. 605 (2004); Lake View School District, No. 25 v. Huckabee, 2005 
Ark. LEXIS 773 (2005); Brigham v. State of Vermont, 2005 VT 105, 889 A.2d 715 (2005). 
3schools.  Instead, a vigorous liberal democracy must develop a framework for education 
that gives all of these interests some accommodation.  Moreover, a nuanced analysis of 
the legitimate interests at stake can minimize these conflicts and best accommodate the 
legitimate interests at stake.  In this article, I seek to lay the groundwork for such an 
approach. 
 I focus here specifically on controversies involving civic education in public 
schools, because this is the subject of many of the most hard-fought conflicts surrounding 
public education.7 The issue of children’s civic education is a particularly thorny one for 
a liberal democracy like the United States.  As democratic theorists have long recognized, 
preparing children for democratic citizenship is an important and demanding 
responsibility. 8 The collective self-rule required of democracy means that, among other 
things, citizens must be committed to political equality, to listening to other points of 
view, to resolving issues through deliberation rather than force, and to the rule of law.  
 
7 See, e.g.,  Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995); Immediato v. Rye 
Neck School Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 
8 Even Joseph Schumpeter, who presented a fairly unambitious account of democracy, argued that its 
success depends on “the human material of politics – the people who man the party machines, are 
elected to serve in parliament, rise to cabinet office –  . . . be[ing] of sufficiently high quality.” JOSEPH 
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 289-90 (1950).  He added that politically 
relevant players in society must be willing and able to exercise “democratic self-control,” in which 
politicians abide by applicable laws, avoid miscarriages of justice, and support the integrity of the 
legislature and voters allow leaders to rule; all concerned, moreover, must have “a large measure of 
tolerance for different opinions” and must have the patience to allow others to sound their views. Id.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the continued survival of a democracy depends 
on producing new generations of rational, capable citizens. “[E]ducation is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local government. . . .  It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it 
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.” Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 
4These qualities do not simply arise in citizens spontaneously, but require nurture.9 To 
add to the complexity of the issue, however, the United States is not merely a democracy, 
it is a liberal democracy, whose commitment to majoritarian rule is tempered by the 
understanding that some personal rights and liberties should not be subject to the 
majority’s preferences.10 The deliberate promotion of the qualities that make for good 
citizens therefore stands in tension with the great weight that liberalism places on 
respecting citizens’ own views of the good life, including how to rear their children.   
Furthermore, insofar as the state uses public education to promote particular 
virtues, it raises liberalism’s suspicion of state despotism. As John Stuart Mill wrote in 
opposing public education,  
That the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State 
hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating.  All that has been said of the 
importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of 
conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education.  
A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly 
like one another . . . [I]t establishes a despotism over the mind.11 
A century and a half after Mill wrote, there is little debate about the legitimacy of public 
education, itself, but a vigorous dispute remains regarding the appropriate scope of the 
 
9 “[Public] education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the 
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to 
the practice of self government in the community and the nation.” Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (quoting C. BEARD and M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 228 (1968)).  
 
10 I use the term “liberalism” throughout this article to refer to the Anglo-American line of political 
thought stretching from John Locke through John Stuart Mill and on to such contemporary thinkers as John 
Rawls, whose work focuses on the importance of liberty, self-government, and equal rights for citizens.  
This use of the term is therefore broader than the use of the term “liberal” in common parlance to refer to 
those who hold political beliefs at the opposite end of the political spectrum from conservatives.  Under my 
use of the term, both thinkers such as John Rawls, who might qualify as a liberal under common usage, and 
Robert Nozick, who might be considered a political conservative, are “liberals.” 
 
11 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 130 (1991). 
5education that public schools and the state can require of its young citizens, particularly 
over the objection of their parents.   
 In this article, I address this dispute.   My primary project is theoretical: I seek to 
illuminate the contradictory goods and interests at stake in civic education, and to set out 
a theoretical framework that resolves these tensions in a matter most consistent with the 
ideals that underlie the liberal democratic project.  Because courts have been so integrally 
involved in the resolution of these issues as a result of constitutional challenges, however, 
I also seek to translate this framework into constitutional doctrine.  This discussion 
consists of four parts.  In Part I, I set out the basic framework of the problem by 
considering several disputes over civic education that have arisen in recent years.  I argue 
that these cases are so difficult for liberal democratic theory because of the conflicting 
claims to authority that are inherent in a liberal democracy.  In this form of government, 
the majority, parents, and children themselves all have legitimate (and potentially 
conflicting) claims to have particular goods furthered with respect to civic education.  In 
Part II, I argue that leading theories of civic education founder because they fail to attend 
to the full range of legitimate claims.  Part III demonstrates that a more nuanced analysis 
of these claims to authority ameliorates some of the tensions among them.  I then offer an 
alternative approach that seeks to better balance these varying claims to authority, and the 
goods that they support.   Finally, Part IV argues that the theoretical approach I set out in 
Part III, although certainly not mandated by current constitutional doctrine, can be 
incorporated into current constitutional frameworks to assess challenges to civic 
education programs. 
 
6I.  Recent Civic Education Conflicts 
Battles regarding civic education have turned in recent years over the issue of 
whether the state can educate children in public schools over their parents’, and 
sometimes their own, objections.  Two well-known cases, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 12 and 
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education,13 have become touchstones in this 
debate.  In addition, several more recent cases demonstrate the complexity of the issues 
raised.   I describe them here not to analyze the legal analysis that courts engage in, but 
because these cases provide factual scenarios that help to explore the normative 
complexity of civic education in a liberal democracy. 
In the first of the cases that have served as flashpoints for this discussion, Yoder,
Amish parents challenged a state law requiring that children attend high school until age 
sixteen.  The parents contended that requiring their older children to attend school with 
non-Amish students violated their right to free exercise of religion both by teaching them 
information that would undercut the Amish’s simple way of life, and by exposing their 
children to worldly attitudes that contradicted Amish religious beliefs.14 Essentially, the 
parents argued that their children’s exposure to education beyond that needed to run a 
simple farm, as well as exposure to the way non-Amish children lived, would lead to a 
worldliness among the students that threatened the continued existence of the community, 
 
12 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 13 Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
14 Amish parents disagreed with the high school’s emphasis on “intellectual and scientific 
accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students.” 
They contended that these values contradicted the Amish beliefs in “informal learning-through-doing; a life 
of goodness, rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community welfare, 
rather than competition; and separation from, rather than integration with, the contemporary worldly 
society.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211.  
 
7as well as the parents’ and children’s religious health.15 In response, the state of 
Wisconsin argued both that the educational requirement was necessary to prepare the 
children to participate effectively in our liberal democratic system,16 and that this 
education was necessary to prepare the children to be self-sufficient participants in 
society.17 
In the other civic education case that has reached iconic status, Mozert, plaintiffs, 
born-again Christian parents of children attending Hawkins County, Tennessee public 
schools, were less successful in their free exercise challenge to the school system’s use of 
a particular series of basic reading texts, the Holt, Rinehart & Winston readers.  Sounding 
a note similar to the parents in Yoder, the Mozert plaintiffs objected to the readers on the 
ground that they exposed their children to cultures, values, and ways of life that were 
prohibited by their fundamentalist faith.  For example, the parents found objectionable a 
story depicting a young boy enjoying cooking, and a story about the religious and social 
 
15 The Amish objected to formal high school education “not only because it place[d] Amish children in an 
environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition in class work and sports and 
with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also because it [took] them 
away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period 
of life.” Id. at 211. Amish teenagers are expected to begin learning and espousing the attitudes and values 
befitting their role as adults in the Amish community. Parents argued that exposing them to contradictory 
values jeopardized the future of the Amish community as a whole. Id.
16 In defense of its requirement, the state argued that “some degree of education is necessary to prepare 
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve 
freedom and independence.” Id. at 221.  
 
17 Id. at 205.   
 
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court sided with the parents.  It held that the state’s interest in 
preparing children to participate in our open political system did not rise to the compelling level necessary 
to justify interference with the parents’ religious beliefs.  According to the Court, because the children were 
being prepared for life in a separate agrarian community rather than in modern society, they did not need 
the more complex understandings of society and government that other children might need. “It is one 
thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when 
its goal is the preparation of the child for life in modern society as the majority live, but it is quite another if 
the goal of education be viewed as the preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian community 
that is the keystone of the Amish faith.”  Id. at 222. 
8practices of an Indian settlement in New Mexico.  They contended that these and other 
portions of the readers prompted their children to think that ways of life and values other 
than those their parents supported could be acceptable – a view incompatible with their 
fundamentalist beliefs.18 
In addition to Yoder and Mozert, more recent cases demonstrate the varied range 
of clashes among parents, students, and schools that continue to emerge on this issue.  
For example, in Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, 19 parents and students of 
Chelmsford High School in Massachusetts objected to students being required to attend a 
school-wide assembly that featured an AIDS awareness program for students.  The 
plaintiffs alleged that in the course of the 90-minute presentation, the owner of a private 
company hired by the school to perform AIDS education presented sexually explicit 
monologues and participated in sexually suggestive skits with several students chosen 
from the audience.  The plaintiffs asserted that the presenter not only joked with students 
about premarital sexual activity (including encouraging one male student to display his 
“orgasm face” to the crowd), she also discussed approvingly oral sex, masturbation, 
homosexual sexual activity, and condom use.  In doing so, the parents contended, the 
school educated children about sex in a manner that both violated the parents’ deeply-
held religious beliefs and interfered with their parental prerogatives.  The students, 
 
18 The Mozert district court held that the compulsory use of the textbooks violated the plaintiffs' free 
exercise of religion, and ordered the school to permit the students to "opt-out" of the school's reading 
program. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1203 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).  On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit 
reversed the district court's ruling and held that the school system's compulsory use of the textbooks did not 
unconstitutionally burden the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion.  Backing off from the Yoder court’s 
deferential view of parents’ interests, the Mozert court held that so long as students were not compelled to 
affirm or disaffirm any particular religious belief or practice, mere exposure to religiously objectionable 
material did not burden their free exercise rights.  Mozert, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 
19 Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).  
9meanwhile, asserted that their compelled attendance deprived them of their privacy rights 
and their rights to an education free from sexual harassment.20 
In Immediato v. Rye Neck School District, 21 a high school student and his parents 
contested the district’s mandatory community service program.  The parents asserted that 
the program, which required students to complete 40 hours of community service work to 
earn their diplomas, interfered with their prerogative to raise their child with the ethics 
that they chose to impart to him.  In contrast to the other cases discussed, the parents did 
not raise a claim of religious freedom.  Instead, they objected to the school requiring their 
child to participate on due process grounds, contending that it infringed on their right to 
direct his upbringing and education.  The student asserted, among other claims, that the 
program infringed on his liberty interests.22 
20 The students asserted that the sexually explicit program “humiliated and intimidated” them, and 
contended that in the weeks after the assembly, many of their peers “displayed overtly sexual behavior” 
which increased their harassment.  Id. at 529.  The First Circuit, in denying the plaintiffs’ claims, held that 
while the parents’ religious freedom prevented the state from foreclosing them from choosing a different 
path of education for their children than public schools, this freedom does not encompass “a fundamental 
constitutional right to dictate the curriculum at the public school to which they have chosen to send their 
children.” Id.at 534.   In the Court’s words: 
 
If all parents had a fundamentally constitutional right to dictate individually what the 
schools teach their children, the school would be forced to cater a curriculum for each 
student whose parents had genuine moral disagreements with the school’s choice of 
subject matter.  We cannot see that the Constitution imposes such a burden on state 
educational systems, and accordingly find that the rights of parents . . . do not encompass 
a broad-based right to restrict the flow of information in the public schools. 
 
Id. at 535. 
 
21 Immediato v. Rye Neck School Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996).     
 
22 Id. at 461-62.  In reviewing the case, the Second Circuit applied only a rational basis level of scrutiny 
because the parents’ and student’s objection to the program was not based on religion.  It then found that 
the school district easily passed that test.  In the Court’s words:  
 
The state’s interest in education extends to teaching students the values and habits of 
good citizenship, and introducing them to their social responsibilities as citizens. . . . 
[T]he mandatory community service program rationally furthers this state objective.  The 
District reasonably concluded that the mandatory community service program would 
expose students to the needs of their communities and to the various ways in which a 
10
Finally, in the last of these newer cases, Leebaert v. Harrington,23 the 
father of a seventh-grader attending a Fairfield, Connecticut public school 
challenged a state regulation requiring his son to attend health education classes at 
a public school that included information on health, character, citizenship, family 
planning, human sexuality, AIDS awareness, and social aspects of family life.  
The school permitted parents to excuse their children from the six classes 
involving family-life instruction and AIDS education, but not the other sessions of 
the health program.  The father argued that it was his Fourteenth Amendment 
right for his son “to be home schooled regarding health, morals, ethical and 
personal behavior.”24 
In all these cases, parents, and sometimes students themselves, opposed school 
programs that, from the state’s perspective, furthered important interests.  Some programs 
were intended to develop the civic virtues the state believed necessary for liberal 
democracy.  Many, as well, were intended to serve what the state believed to be 
 
democratic system of volunteerism can respond to those needs.  In doing so, the program 
helps students recognize their place in their communities, and, ideally, inspires them to 
introspection regarding their larger role in our political system. 
 
The Fourth Circuit ruled similarly in a comparable case in the same year.  In Herndon by Herndon v. 
Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. Of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (1996), North Carolina parents challenged the 
district’s program requiring students to perform 50 hours of community service in grades 9-12 in order to 
graduate.  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the school system, 
holding that the program passed rational basis review because it was rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest. 
 
23 Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). 
24 Id. at 136.  On appeal, the Leebaert plaintiff conceded that the challenged curriculum would pass rational 
basis review since the program would be a rational way of furthering the health and welfare of children. He 
contended, however, that strict scrutiny was appropriate, both because the case concerned a parent’s 
fundamental right to control their child’s upbringing, and because the curriculum implicated his free 
exercise rights.  The Court rejected the father’s claim that parents had a fundamental right to dictate public 
school curricula on the ground that recognizing such a right “would make it difficult or impossible for any 
public school authority to administer school curricula responsive to the overall educational needs of the 
community and its children.”  Id. at 141. 
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children’s interests – for example to teach them to be autonomous, and to be able to 
support themselves in society.  From the parents’ perspective, however, this education 
conflicted with deeply-held beliefs, often religiously based, about how to raise their 
children.25 From the children’s perspective, moreover, this education sometimes forced 
them to consider views with which they disagreed. 
The objection that parents had to the challenged programs in many of these cases, 
including in Yoder and Mozert, was less that students would learn particular substantive 
information with which the parents disagreed than that the simple fact of their exposure 
to other ways of life would teach children that a number of ways of life are acceptable – a 
view that the fundamentalist parents in these cases opposed.26 For example, in Yoder the 
parents feared that their children’s exposure to non-Amish children and to other sets of 
beliefs might cause the children to believe that they could choose ways of life different 
from the Amish community in which they had been raised.  While belief in the value of 
individuals being able to choose their own path in life is a hallmark of liberalism, it is 
deeply opposed to the beliefs of the Amish community.  By the same token, the Yoder 
parents and the state disagreed about whether it was in the children’s interest to learn to 
become a self-supporting member of society.  The state believed it was; the parents 
believed it was not.  Likewise, in Mozert, the parents were concerned that exposing 
children to religious practices from other religions and to different ways of life might 
teach their children that other religions and ways of life were equally worthy of respect.27 
25 See Nomi Stolzenburg, He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Perils 
of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993).   
 
26 See id. 
27 In Mozert, two parents testified that they objected to the readers because they contained passages “that 
expose[d] their children to other forms of religion and to the feelings, attitudes, and values of other students 
12
While the view that religions should be treated as equally worthy of respect, at least as a 
political matter, is a virtue in liberalism, that view deeply conflicted with the plaintiff-
parents’ religion.   
The question then arises: how much authority should the state have to educate 
students for civic ends over their parents’, and sometimes students’ own, objections?   
And, to turn the question around, should parents have veto power over the state’s 
attempts to teach liberal democratic virtues and other lessons the state believes are 
important to their children?  What are the limits of the state’s authority in this area?  
Despite extensive discussion of this issue in political and legal theory,28 the answers to 
these questions presented in political and legal theory have thus far not been adequate. 
 
II.  Existing Theories of the Proper Scope of Civic Education 
The question of the proper line of demarcation between the state’s and parents’ 
authority over children’s education has attracted significant scholarly attention.29 The 
resulting conversation, however, has produced considerably more dissension than 
 
that contradict[ed] the plaintiffs’ religious views without a statement that the other views [were] incorrect 
and that the plaintiffs’ views [were] the correct ones. Mozert., 827 F.2d at 1065.  
 
28 See e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); ISAIAH BERLIN, Two 
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 18, 169 (1969); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1978); WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE 
LIBERAL STATE (1991); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1999); LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL 
TRADITION IN AMERICA (1991); STEPHEN  MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A 
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 278 (1990); LINDA 
MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY (2005); 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICIAL LIBERALISM (1983); 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972); JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY (1950); THOMAS SPRAGENS, CIVIC LIBERALISM: REFLECTIONS ON OUR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 
(1999); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1991); Emily Buss, Allocating 
Developmental Control Between Parent, Child, and the State, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27; Stephen G. 
Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U.CHI. L. REV. 937 (1996); Tyll van Geel, 
Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other and Next Century: Citizenship Education and the 
Free Exercise of Religion, 34 AKRON L. REV. 293 (2000). 
29 See authorities cited supra note 28. 
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agreement.  In this section, I consider the discussions on civic education by four 
prominent theorists:  Bruce Ackerman, Stephen Gilles, Amy Gutmann, and William 
Galston.  Each of their analyses, I argue, focuses on too narrow a spectrum of the range 
of interests to which a liberal democracy must attend, and ignores other important 
interests that are also entitled to significant attention.  Because of these theories’ limited 
scope, all of them fail to work out a satisfactory balance among these important interests. 
 
A.  Bruce Ackerman: Emphasis on Children’s Autonomy 
 The renaissance of liberal political theory in the United States that began in the 
1970s with the publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice assumed that a distinctive 
feature of the liberal state is its neutrality among individuals’ conceptions of the good 
life.30 The liberal state, in this view, is a limited state whose purpose is to preserve as 
much autonomy of citizens as possible so that they can live out their own vision of the 
good life.  In his now classic work, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980), Bruce 
Ackerman argued that this precept of state neutrality means that a liberal theory of 
education precludes both parents and the state from inculcating in children “an uncritical 
acceptance of any conception of the good life.”31 According to Ackerman, “We have no 
right to look upon future citizens as if we were master gardeners who can tell the 
difference between a pernicious weed and a beautiful flower.”32 Instead, it is the role of 
liberal education to “provide children with a sense of the very different lives that could be 
 
30 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972); BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL 
STATE (1980); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE 
AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: 
Political Not Metaphysical 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985). 
 
31 ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 163. 
32 Id. at 139. 
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theirs – so that, as they approach maturity, they have the cultural materials available to 
build lives equal to their evolving conceptions of the good.”33 
In his approach, Ackerman accorded parents broad rights to control the cultural 
diversity to which younger children are exposed during primary education on the ground 
that children need significant cultural coherence in order to locate their own place in the 
world.34 Parents’ authority to control diversity, however, recedes as a child grows older 
and can tolerate greater challenges to parental ideas.35 As children progress through 
secondary school, both society and their parents should therefore expose them to more 
diverse cultural materials to ensure that, as they approach adulthood, they have the raw 
materials to define who they want to be.36 
Ackerman’s broad affirmation of children’s autonomy is appealing in many ways.  
Liberalism’s respect for each individual’s autonomy certainly means that children need to 
be given the resources and education that allow them the capacity for self-determination.  
Yet Ackerman’s view that this should be the extent of a child’s character education 
ultimately gives far too much weight to this value as against other values.  Importantly, 
Ackerman gives no weight to the polity’s interest in insuring that citizens develop other 
civic virtues besides autonomy that are necessary to function in a liberal democracy.  Yet 
many of the virtues essential to a flourishing democracy, such as a belief in the political 
 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 141. 
35 See also Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Between Parent, Child, and the State, 2004 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 27. Although Buss makes a slightly different argument for the balancing of control between 
parents and the state, she nonetheless echoes Ackerman’s argument that control over the child’s education 
should be gradually ceded to the child as the child matures.  
 
36 Id. at 159. 
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equality of all citizens, are virtues specific to democracies, rather than the obvious 
choices that children would arrive at if left to their own devices.37 Because of this, 
Ackerman’s view that the state should merely present options of different ways of life to 
children makes his version of liberalism unlikely to produce the committed, responsible 
citizens needed for a liberal democracy to function well.  Instead, the array of choices 
presented to children is far more likely to produce a society that would justify Stephen 
Macedo’s likening of liberal culture to Californian culture – in which people constantly 
try on new lifestyles and principles without buying wholeheartedly into any of them 
(besides that of personal freedom).38 
Further, in giving paramount weight to children’s autonomy, Ackerman ignores 
parents’ deeply-held interests in passing on to children their own vision of the good life.  
As Stephen Gilles argues, raising children is central to the life plan of many adults.  Part 
and parcel of raising children is imparting one’s own vision of the good life to them.  
While this interest would seem to merit at least some weight, Ackerman dismisses it as 
illegitimate.  Similarly, he discounts the interests of the democracy in ensuring that the 
majority can pass on its way of life and its view of the good life to the next generation. 
In summary, Ackerman certainly gets it right when he focuses on the importance 
of developing children’s capacity for autonomy.  A liberal democracy that respects 
citizens’ choices because it believes that these choices reflect a capacity for individual 
and collective determination must indeed seek to assure that its young citizens develop 
 
37 See GALSTON, supra note 28, at 244-46. 
 
38 See MACEDO, , supra note 28, at 278.   Stephen Gilles writes that “ordinary experience suggests that 
many (if not most) children, if raised in accord with Ackerman’s plan, would choose a life of easy, 
immediate, undisciplined self-gratification, rather than a life of responsibility, hard work, and discipline.” 
Gilles argues that “Ackerman’s education may foster persons who are slaves to their own appetites, rather 
than self-governing moral individuals.”  Gilles, supra note 28, at 951. 
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this capacity.  Yet Ackerman is wrong that children’s autonomy circumscribes the 
legitimate boundaries of civic education.   In a liberal democracy, parents have some 
legitimate (although certainly not an absolute) interest in raising children who will follow 
their way of life, culture, and traditions.39 Likewise, the state has a legitimate interest in 
encouraging children to adopt the values of the democracy and civic virtues that will 
enhance the health of the polity.40 
B.  Stephen Gilles: A Parentalist Manifesto 
If Ackerman’s vision veers too heavily in the direction of children’s autonomy, 
Stephen Gilles’ project veers too heavily in the direction of their parents’ autonomy.  In a 
1996 University of Chicago Law Review article, Gilles vigorously defends parents’ rights 
to pass on their way of life to their children, and opposes civic education over parents’ 
objections.41 Gilles rests his contention that parents should have veto power over 
children’s civic education on two basic arguments.  First, given the lack of liberal 
consensus on what constitutes the good life and, consequently, the good education, and 
the absence of any standards to decide these issues authoritatively, Gilles contends that 
 
39 Cf. Gilles, , supra note 28, at 948-49 (“Believers in quite diverse ways of life (secular as well as 
religious) are alike in thinking that their children should be brought up to believe in their way of life, so that 
they will learn its full meaning and rewards, and thus adhere to it as adults. Ackerman treats acting on this 
sort of educational judgment as illiberal in principle. His brand of liberalism requires a commitment to the 
view that the child’s freedom to choose must trump the values of the child’s educators, whoever they prove 
to be.”).  
 
40 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534 (the state  “unquestionably has the power to reasonably 
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise, and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all 
children of a proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic 
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be 
taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”).  
 
41 Gilles, supra note 28, at 938 (1996).   
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decision-making authority is properly vested in parents, who are “more likely to pursue 
the child’s best interest as they define it.”42 
Second, Gilles disputes the notion that the state has a paramount interest in 
controlling the education of children.43 As against the state’s interest, he contends,  
individuals have an even more fundamental interest in nurturing their children and 
in being nurtured by their parents.  Contemporary liberal theory tends to assume 
not only that citizenship comes first, and individuality second, but also that – even 
within the realm of individuality – marriage, family, and child rearing are merely 
one prominent set of pursuits.  These assumptions invert the priorities by which  
most reasonable people live.  For the overwhelming majority, the loving 
relationships we share with our spouses, our children, our siblings, and the parents 
who educated us are at the heart of our individual conceptions of the good life.44 
According to Gilles, the human flourishing of both parents and children depends on 
parental nurturing and education; parental control over the values children are taught is 
essential to that enterprise.   
On the basis of these two rationales, Gilles argues that parents’ views regarding 
their children’s schooling must be respected so long as they are reasonable, in the sense 
that they “acknowledge the importance of normal human development, embrace civic 
toleration and respect for law, and acquiesce in our basic constitutional arrangements.”45 
As Gilles recognizes, this gives parents very broad authority over their children’s 
education: “Because few parents in our society will choose to educate their children in 
ways that fail to satisfy these standards, states will only rarely be able to justify 
 
42 Id. at 940. 
43 Gilles asserts that “individuals have an even more fundamental interest in nurturing their children and in 
being nurtured by their parents.” Id. at 941. 
 
44 Id. at 940-41. 
45 Id. at 939. Gilles contends that “the state acts illegitimately when it promotes some reasonable 
conceptions of the good at the expense of others by mandating the values children must be taught in 
school.” Gilles, supra note 29 at 939. 
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overriding parents’ educational authority.”46 Based on this framework of analysis, Gilles 
argues that the parents in both Yoder and Mozert properly had the right to decide their 
children’s educational fate.  In Yoder, Gilles contends, requiring children to go to public 
school beyond the eighth grade exceeds the societal consensus of the civic education 
required to support the polity.  Because of this, he argues, parents properly had the right 
to choose the education for children past that grade that was appropriate to their lives in 
the Amish community.  In Mozert, Gilles asserts, the state’s effort to teach respect for 
other ways of life also exceeds the liberal consensus on this issue and hence should not 
have been imposed over their parents’ objection. 
Gilles’ account, in contrast to Ackerman’s that was written a generation before, 
recognizes the validity of a number of important different interests, including the state’s 
interest in instilling civic virtues as well as children’s interest in autonomy.  Based on the 
formalistic structure of his argument, however, Gilles winds up giving parental interests 
almost complete weight as against the other important interests that he identifies.47 That 
there are no definitive standards for sorting out what constitutes good civic character, 
though, does not mean that the polity’s interest in such character should be ignored, or 
that there are not better and worse arguments to be made with respect to civic character, 
any more than the recognition that there are no definitive standards for art should lead art 
museums to empty out their galleries.  Insofar as citizens’ need for civic virtues is taken 
seriously, the question Gilles should be asking is not “who has the best incentives to 
 
46 Id. at 939-40.   In fact, Gilles asserts that “[l]iberal statecraft should not merely tolerate parental 
education: it should encourage and rely on that self-sacrificing, self-fulfilling work by respecting parents’ 
educational choices unless they unreasonably deprive children of the essential prerequisites for adult life 
and liberal citizenship.” Id. at  941.  
 
47 Id. at 940. 
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further the child’s best interests?” but instead “who has the best incentives to further the 
polity’s interest in developing civic virtue in children?”  In answering this latter question, 
parents are disadvantaged compared to the state precisely because they are likely to be 
focused on their child’s individual interests rather than the polity’s long-term interests.   
This is not to argue, of course, that the child’s best interests should not be 
considered, but rather to recognize that the difficult enterprise of maintaining a vigorous 
liberal democracy requires that more than only the interests of children as individuals be 
considered.  And this means that sometimes an expansive reading of individual interests – 
both parents’ and children’s – needs to be constrained to take into account the needs of 
the polity.  Gilles’ argument – that contemporary liberalism should take parents’ private 
interests in rearing their children more seriously than citizenship interests – therefore 
misses a critical point.  The point is that citizens must give up some portion of their 
autonomy to secure the very freedom to raise their children that Gilles lauds, since 
without citizens’ acquiring civic virtues liberal democracy will founder. 
And while Gilles is certainly correct that complete consensus regarding the civic 
virtues required for a healthy liberal democracy will never be possible, and that the finer 
points of these virtues will always be debatable, he also overstates the extent of this 
debate.  In contrast to the difficulty of knowing what a good life should be, the inquiry 
regarding what skills and traits are needed to support a liberal democracy is considerably 
more directed.   As William Galston counsels, “If sufficiently rigorous criteria are 
employed, we are of course forced to conclude that we ‘know’ nothing.  If, however, we 
adopt criteria appropriate to the subject matter, it turns out that we know a fair amount 
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about what promotes our . . . collective wellbeing.”48 In this regard, it is clear that a 
vigorous liberal democracy requires that children understand that deep differences in 
beliefs exist among citizens of the polity, come to learn to respect others’ rights, and to 
listen carefully to others’ opinions.  Children must learn to adopt a position of liberal 
humility in which they recognize that, even if they believe they are right about particular 
comprehensive views,49 they cannot prove this and should not seek to foist these views 
on others, and that politics should be more than a free-for-all in which the majority 
attempts to wield the coercive power of the state to defend its own contested vision of 
morality on others.  Finally, children must learn to support fundamental liberal 
institutions such as the separation of church and state.  While there is room for reasonable 
debate over the precise boundaries of some of these skills and virtues, there is at least 
considerable agreement around their core. 
Not only does Gilles’ proposal fail to assure that such civic virtues will be taught, 
it also gives little weight to safeguarding children’s autonomy.  It is somewhat ironic that 
Gilles relies so firmly on autonomy in his defense of parental rights but would deny the 
preconditions of autonomy to their children, since he defers to parental views that their 
children should not be exposed to other ways of life or systems of thought or values. The 
bar of acceding to “normal human development” that Gilles requires parents to clear is so 
low that it would allow parents to deny their children the knowledge that they have basic 
choices about how to live their lives.  Liberalism’s respect for diverse ways of life is tied 
 
48 See GALSTON, supra note 28, at 11. 
 
49 I adopt John Rawls’ terminology here.  Rawls uses the term “comprehensive” to refer to conceptions of 
the good life that are more wide-ranging than doctrines confined to the political realm.  JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 29 n.31 (1983).  Rawls believed that liberal doctrine was unnecessarily oppressive 
if it imposed a comprehensive rather than political vision of the good life.  
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directly to the importance that it places on respect for an individual’s self-determination.  
In placing so few safeguards on ensuring children’s right to self-determination, and so 
much power in parents’ hands to deprive children of opportunities necessary to achieve it, 
Gilles’ violates these fundamental liberal precepts.   
 
C.  Amy Gutmann: The Interests of the Democracy 
 In contrast to Gilles, Amy Gutmann presents a theory of civic education that 
places the lion’s share of authority to resolve controversies over public education with the 
majority in a democracy.50 Gutmann argues that approaches like Gilles’s, which give 
parents the power to decide what children learn in public schools, are unsatisfactory 
because they fail to recognize that children are not only members of their family, but they 
are also members of the polity.  The polity, too, has a strong interest in the qualities and 
capacities of its future citizens.  This means, Gutmann sensibly argues, that “the 
educational authority of parents and of polities has to be partial to be justified.”51 
Gutmann therefore proposes a power-sharing agreement in which parents educate their 
children about their own conceptions of the good life at home; meanwhile, the democratic 
state has the task of educating students in accordance with its own principles at school.52 
Gutmann contends that the shared educational authority that she advocates “supports the 
core value of democracy: conscious social reproduction in its most inclusive form.”53 
50 See AMY GUTMANN, supra note 28. 
 
51 Id. at 30. 
 52 Id. at 42-43. 
 53 Id. at 42. 
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Gutmann grounds the moral justification for public control of children’s education 
on the moral claims of deliberative democracy.  She argues that “[t]he most justifiable 
way of making mutually binding decisions in a representative democracy – including 
decisions not to deliberate about some matters – is by deliberative decision making, 
where the decision makers are accountable to the people who are most affected by their 
decisions.”54 In determining the content of the public education that children will 
receive, Gutmann counsels, “[t]he policies that result from our democratic deliberations 
will not always be the right ones, but they will be more enlightened – by the values and 
concerns of the many communities that constitute a democracy.”55 
This does not mean, for Gutmann, that the simple will of the majority should 
guide a democracy’s decisions regarding the substantive content of education.  To the 
contrary, Gutmann argues that the same democratic principles that give moral weight to 
the deliberative decisions of the polity also “commit[] it to assuring children an education 
that makes those freedoms both possible and meaningful in the future.”56 Put another 
way, “[d]eliberative decision making and accountability presuppose a citizenry whose 
education prepares them to deliberate, and to evaluate the results of the deliberations of 
their representatives.  A primary aim of publicly mandated schooling is therefore to 
cultivate the skills and virtues of deliberation.”57 
Gutmann argues that this deliberative mission not only gives schools a positive 
program to effectuate, it also constrains democratic authority in two specific ways.  First, 
 
54 Id. at xiii. 
 55 Id. at 11. 
 56 Id. at 30. 
 57 Id. at xiii. 
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education must conform to the principle of nonrepression – that is, it may not exclude 
deliberation regarding any particular rational ideas.   Second, it must conform to the 
principle of nondiscrimination – meaning that neither parents nor a democracy may adopt 
practices that would keep some children or groups of children from developing the skills 
necessary to participate in democratic deliberation.  Under this scheme, communities are 
allowed to shape their children’s world, but they may not exercise this authority in ways 
that deprive these children of the same right to participate in deliberations about their 
collective fate at a later time.  
 For Gutmann, this means that in the Mozert case, the parents’ challenge to the 
school’s exposing their children to the readers was appropriately denied on the ground 
that the challenged readers were within the school system’s prerogative of educating 
children for character while they are at school.  The fact that some parents opposed the 
content of these readers based on deeply-held religious beliefs should not serve as a 
ground for exempting the children or abandoning the curriculum.  “The right to free 
exercise of religion does not entail the right of parents to near-exclusive or 
comprehensive authority over their children’s schooling.”58 While fundamentalists have 
a right to teach their children their religious beliefs at home, parents do not have a right to 
withdraw their children from the school’s chosen curriculum unless the education 
violates the principles of nonrepression or nondiscrimination.  Otherwise, “democratic 
institutions are denied their legitimate role in shaping the character of citizens.”59 In 
Gutmann’s view, this means that civic education can permissibly exceed what scholars 
 
58 Id. at 298. 
 59 Amy Gutmann, Undemocratic Education, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 43 (1989). 
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such as Galston refer to as the “civic minimum” necessary to ensure that a democracy 
runs smoothly.60 
Gutmann’s argument has continued to be the most eloquent and important defense 
of the democratic interests at stake in public education, in the form of the polity’s right to 
shape the education of its young citizens, since it was first published in 1987.  And it is 
not only democratic interests, as measured by the deliberated will of the majority, that is 
served by her theory: Gutmann’s emphasis on the necessary preconditions to the exercise 
of that will, in the form of ensuring that children develop the qualities and skills that 
enable them to make deliberative decisions about their individual and collective lives, 
ensures that children develop what are sometimes called “civic virtues.”  Further, when 
these qualities and skills are paired with Gutmann’s democratic principles of 
nondiscrimination and nonrepression, her theory both promotes and safeguards children’s 
autonomy – thereby incorporating the traditional liberal concerns reflected in Ackerman’s 
work – into a larger normative whole.    
Despite these considerable accomplishments, however, Gutmann’s theory fails to 
give adequate weight to one important set of interests: those of parents in transmitting 
their ways of life to their children.  Gutmann contends that public education does not 
need to be limited to protect this parental interest because parents still have the 
opportunity to pass along their ways of life through their contact with their children at 
home.  Yet the broad scope that she accords the state to educate within public schools 
would allow parents little area immune from contestation by the state.  Take, for 
 
60 See, e.g., GUTMANN, , supra note 28, at 303 (“Having granted that publicly subsidized and publicly 
mandated schools should serve civic purposes, civic minimalists lack good reasons for insisting that the 
civic purposes of schooling be minimal.”).  
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example, Gutmann’s discussion of sex education in schools.  Gutmann acknowledges the 
thorniness of this issue but argues that, ultimately, democratic deliberation and 
decisionmaking should determine whether the subject should be taught.  She would 
therefore accept the conservative position of avoid teaching sex education, or the liberal 
position that all children should be taught sex education even over the objection of their 
parents, so long as the determination arrived at was democratically sanctioned.61 She 
argues, however, that although any such decision reached through democratic processes 
should legitimately be implemented, either such decision would be unwise policy.  
Failing to teach sex education, she argues, will not, as conservatives believe, restore the 
sanctity of sex; while, contrary to liberal beliefs, mandatory sex education would also be 
unwise because it is as “offensive to parents who believe in the sanctity of sex as 
mandatory prayer is to parents who do not believe in God.”62 As a result, such policies 
could “lead conservative parents to flee the public schools.”  Taking this into account, 
Gutmann argues that a wiser policy would allow schools to offer such programs but allow 
parents to exempt their children from such courses.63 
I discuss infra at Part III my view of how conflicts between parents and the state 
with respect to sex education should be resolved.  For now, let me simply point out that 
Gutmann’s approach in itself establishes no real limits on the state’s authority to educate 
students in the face of parents’ objections.  Instead, Gutmann suggests that teaching sex 
education would be unwise as a prudential matter, since conservative parents might 
 
61 Id. at 109. 
 62 Id. at 110. 
 63 Id. 
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otherwise leave the schools.  In doing so, while her approach adequately reflects the 
ideals of democracy, it less adequately incorporates liberal ideals that parents should be 
able to pass on their values to children.  There are other issues that might also cause 
conservative parents to leave the schools – for example, teaching evolution in schools.  
Should schools therefore allow parents to pull their children out of classes in which 
evolution is taught?  Most of us – I would suspect including Gutmann – would disagree 
with this result.  The reason we likely find evolution to be a less sympathetic case for 
allowing parents to opt out is not because we think that parents are less likely to pull their 
children out of schools, but because we think that there are some subjects on which 
schools should defer to parent’s wishes, and others on which they should not.  Yet 
Gutmann’s relying on her prudential rationale does not help us think through how these 
lines should be drawn.   
Gutmann also uses prudential reasons to reach a result that accords with liberal 
principles when she considers the issue of whether schools should teach children 
religious standards.  She argues that it would be unwise for schools to teach such 
religious standards because “secular standards constitute a better basis upon which to 
build a common education for citizenship than any set of sectarian religious beliefs – 
better because secular standards are both a fairer and a firmer basis for peacefully 
reconciling our differences.”64 Although Gutmann’s conclusion ultimately accords with 
liberalism’s reluctance to have the state teach comprehensive visions of the good life, her 
rationale would presumably permit such lessons if inculcating children with religious 
ideas would serve a firmer basis for reconciling citizens’ differences.  Yet even if it could 
 
64 GUTMANN, supra note 28, at 103. 
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be shown that the government could settle differences better through teaching children 
particular religious concepts, surely that would still violate our notions that it is the 
function of parents, rather than the state, to teach children religion.  Thus, although 
Gutmann reaches conclusions that ultimately accord with liberal intuitions, this should 
not obscure the fact that her theory contains no principled limitations on schools’ 
education of students in ways that deeply violate these intuitions.  
In sum, Gutmann’s theory does not pay sufficient attention to how to integrate the 
liberal ideals that, along with democratic ideals, are fundamental to our political system.  
Since significant tensions exist between democracy and liberalism – the former focusing 
on group decisionmaking, the latter focusing on individual rights –  Gutmann’s valuing 
one and ignoring the other in her theory of civic education makes for inadequate 
reconciliation of the principles guiding liberal democracy.  We generally assume that 
under a liberal democratic form of government some issues and decisions should remain 
immune from direct government intervention, even the relatively gentle persuasion of 
education.  Gutmann, however, doesn’t help us to think through the location of these 
limits.  Neither does she give sufficient weight to our intuition that, at least in many 
areas, we have some greater interest in passing our beliefs along to our own children than 
we do generally as a polity in determining the course of the next generation.  Gutmann’s 
answer that our children should submit to civic education because we, as citizens, have 
had the opportunity to participate in the democratic process seems less than satisfactory. 
 
D.  William Galston - Civic Liberalism 
 Last but not least, I turn to William Galston’s proposal for civic education.  In 
contrast to the theorists I have discussed thus far, Galston specifically seeks to balance 
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the competing interests at stake in civic education.  He correctly notes that “the most 
poignant problem raised by liberal civic education is the clash between the content of that 
education and the desire of parents to pass on their way of life to their children.”65 
According to Galston, liberal polities can legitimately require their citizens to accede to a 
“basic civic education” that gives them “the beliefs and habits that support the polity and 
enable individuals to function competently in public affairs.”66 In Galston’s view, this 
means that even if it conflicts with parents’ basic beliefs, the state may require children to 
participate in civic education that seeks to inculcate, among other civic virtues, “the 
disposition to respect the rights of others, the capacity to evaluate the talents, character, 
and performance of public officials, and the ability to moderate public desires in the face 
of public limits.”67 
However, in order to give parents’ liberty interests their due in our liberal system, 
Galston argues that the state may legitimately go no further than providing the basic 
education that this “civic minimalist” standard requires.68 In Galstons’s words: 
The state may act in loco parentis to overcome family-based obstacles to 
normal development.  And it may use public instrumentalities, including 
the system of education, to promote the attainment by all children of the 
basic requisites of citizenship.  These are legitimate intrusive powers.  But 
they are limited by their own inner logic.  In a liberal state, interventions 
that cannot be justified on this basis cannot be justified at all.  That is how 
liberal democracies must draw the line between parental and public 
authority over the education of children . . . .69 
65 GALSTON, supra note 28, at 252. 
 66 Id. 
67 Id. at 246. 
 68 Id. at 252. 
69 Id. at 254-55. 
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In contrast to the more ambitious goals that Gutmann supports of teaching children to 
deliberate about different ways of life, in Galston’s view, the fact that the United States is 
a representative democracy rather than a participatory democracy limits the acceptable 
scope of civic education because it requires less of citizens to function competently in the 
political system.70 Specifically, Galston argues that a representative democracy does not 
require citizens to engage in rational deliberation; therefore the state may not legitimately 
develop children’s ability to think about ways of life apart from their own.  In Galston’s 
words, “liberal freedom entails the right to live unexamined as well as examined lives – a 
right the effective exercise of which may require parental bulwarks against the corrosive 
influence of modernist skepticism.”71 
By the same token, Galston’s views on the manner in which civic education 
should be performed are influenced by the elementary level of understanding and 
participation he contends are required in a representative democracy.  He asserts that 
teaching children to support liberal democracy cannot be accomplished through teaching 
them rational inquiry since liberalism takes sides on disputed issues such as equality, 
freedom, and human good that are not definitively settled from a philosophical point of 
view.  Instead, civic education should be taught on a more simplistic level in which 
loyalty to the realm is inculcated, not through a warts-and-all description of American 
history, but through a “nobler moralizing history: a pantheon of heroes who confer 
legitimacy on central institutions.”72 In Galston’s view, “[i]t is unrealistic to believe that 
 
70 Id. at 246-48. 
 71 Id. at 254. 
72 Id. at 244. 
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more than a few adult citizens of liberal societies will ever move beyond the kind of civic 
commitment engendered by such a pedagogy.”73 
On these grounds, Galston disputes Gutmann’s argument that the Amish parents 
in Yoder should have been required to send their children to high school in order to 
expose them to other ways of life, and to teach them to deliberate about their collective 
lives.  In Galston’s words,  
In a liberal-democratic polity, to be sure, the fact of social diversity means that the 
willingness to coexist peacefully with ways of life very different from one’s own 
is essential.  Furthermore, the need for public evaluation of leaders and policies 
means that the state has an interest in developing citizens with at least the minimal 
conditions of reasonable public judgment.  But neither of these civic requirements 
entails a need for public authority to take an interest in how children think about 
different ways of life. . . . In short, the civic standpoint does not warrant the 
state’s conclusion that the state must (or may) structure public education to foster 
in children skeptical reflection on ways of life inherited from parents or local 
communities.74 
In my view, Galston gets the task right when he seeks to carve out a workable 
balance between the civic and liberal interests in determining the permissible breadth of 
civic education (although I would also include democratic interests, as well).  Yet he still 
does not arrive at a workable accommodation among them in several respects.  First, in 
deferring so much to the diverse beliefs held by citizens, Galston defines citizens’ 
necessary competencies too narrowly to support a vigorous liberal democracy, even a 
representative one.  The education that Galston prescribes for future citizens therefore 
risks forfeiting the check on government power that a healthy democracy demands.  A 
vigorous representative democracy requires that representatives be constrained at least to 
some significant extent by the interests of the people, rather than be dictated by the will 
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74 Id. at 253. 
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of only some small portion of the population. While this doesn’t require that each citizen 
be able to act independently as a watchdog against government corruption or 
overreaching, it at least requires that some significant portion of the population be able to 
weigh and heed the claims of the press and others who act as watchdogs. Galston’s 
willingness to allow future citizens to learn little about politics, to leave their own beliefs 
about the world unexamined and their critical faculties unhoned, and, indeed, his 
advocating that the state teach support for the realm in an uncritical manner, run the risk 
of producing citizens who are too easily led by the government, and too quick to believe 
inadequate justifications and explanations.    
Galston’s theory also does not contain the safeguards necessary to insure the 
preservation of individual rights and the commitment to allowing diversity that a liberal 
polity legitimately demands.   In this regard, Galston aims too low when he allows the 
state only to require that children learn to coexist peacefully with others.  The fact of the 
matter is that more is required to maintain the principles of a vigorous liberal democracy 
than the simple fact of peaceful coexistence in the most basic of senses.  As John Rawls 
argues, political liberalism depends on state power being used only for reasons that can 
be publicly justified by resort to reasons that those from a broad array of comprehensive 
philosophies can accept.75 This “public reason” rests on the public ideals and principles 
that have been developed in the context of liberal democratic institutions, and that have 
assumed the role of a public morality. The use of state power to further comprehensive 
agendas that cannot be adequately justified based on public reason is illegitimate.   
 
75 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
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On this view, Galston’s requiring only that students learn peaceful coexistence is 
not sufficient.  The political events of the past few years regarding same-sex marriage 
show that even when certain sectors of society – in this instance the religious right – learn 
to coexist peacefully with others in the sense that they can agree not to deprive them of 
their citizenship, this does not stop repeated efforts to deny them, for reasons justified 
only by their own comprehensive philosophies, the same civil privileges that are 
accorded to others.76 A commitment to coexist peacefully in some very narrow sense, 
then, is not enough to fulfill liberalism’s commitment that state power will not be 
exercised to pursue ends that cannot be justified by public reason.  Further, despite 
Galston’s stated support for teaching children to coexist peacefully, by allowing parents 
to overrule schools’ decisions to expose children to diversity Galston would deny 
children the tools to understand what peaceful coexistence in a society marked by 
 
76 See, e.g., David Kirkpatrick, A Religious Push Against Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, at A12 
(“About 50 prominent religious leaders, including seven Roman Catholic cardinals and about a half-dozen 
archbishops, have signed a petition in support of a constitutional amendment blocking same-sex marriage.
Organizers of the petition said it was in part an effort to revive the groundswell of opposition to same-sex 
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include many influential evangelical Protestants, a few rabbis and an official of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints.”); Johnny Mason, Debate Over Same-Sex Unions Becomes ‘Moral Struggle’,
HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 27, 2003, at B3 (noting an advertisement against same-sex marriage in which 
200 ministers names appeared and quoting Reverend Wayne Carter, one of the petitioners, as saying his 
view on same-sex marriage is “a moral and ethical stance based on the teachings of God.”); Elaine Gale, 
Same-Sex Marriage Ban Galvanizes, Polarizes Churches, L.A. Times, Feb. 28, 2000, at B8 (describing the 
debate over Proposition 22, an initiative to ban gay marriage in the 2000 election, and quoting senior pastor 
Kenton Beshore, one of many religious leaders urging their congregants to vote in support of the 
proposition, as saying, “In the Bible, God defines marriage and limits it to a man and a woman…I say, 
‘Here’s one you get to vote on that’s biblical.’”).   
 
This is not to contend that religious leaders should never enter the political fray, or that religious 
motivations are illegitimate in politics.  As Stephen Macedo argues, religious motivations can and often 
legitimately do motivate believers to participate in the political realm.  In Stephen Macedo’s words, “There 
may be a variety of ways, indeed, in which religious speech can support political liberalism by clarifying 
the depth of one’s commitment to liberal principles and the political authority of public reasons.  The crux 
of the matter is not speech at all, but the legitimate grounds of coercion.  When deciding how we are going 
to direct coercive political powers on matters over which citizens have serious moral disagreements, we 
should seek and articulate adequate public reasons that we can share with our reasonable fellow citizens.  If 
we recognize additional religious reasons and offer these to coreligionists that is surely permissible.”  
Macedo, supra note 28, at 172-73.   
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profound differences really means.  It is easy to make students understand coexisting 
peacefully with those who have similar beliefs; the challenge of liberal democracy is 
coexisting with others with very different beliefs.  Without this type of exposure, lessons 
about peaceful coexistence mean little.   
More than that, Galston’s narrow vision for civic education, far from the recipe to 
appease different groups that Galston perceives it to be, is a recipe for civic disharmony.  
A polity composed of citizens untrained to deliberate rationally about collective concerns 
yields a polity likely to devolve into partisan bickering rather than reasoned attempts to 
bridge differences and to find a common path that those from diverse walks of life can 
choose together.  Further, citizens who cannot rationally deliberate about their common 
future and who have not been made to confront what the later John Rawls called the “fact 
of pluralism”77 are likely to choose leaders whose beliefs not only match their own, but 
who see no difficulty with imposing these beliefs on others.  Such a polity cannot 
safeguard the autonomy and protection of individual rights and liberty that a liberal polity 
must guarantee its citizens.    
This is not to deny that significant attention should be paid to the extent to which 
requiring particular types of civic education alienates particular societal groups. Yet, as 
Galston recognizes, there is a delicate balance to be struck between attempting to 
accommodate as many viewpoints as possible and furthering the core commitments of 
liberal democracy.  Galston’s fundamental impulse, in seeking to promote diverse sets of 
beliefs as well as the moral backbone that strong, committed belief systems can promote, 
tilts him too far toward accommodation.  For Galston,  
 
77 JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, in COLLECTED PAPERS 424-25 (Samuel Freeman 
ed., 1999). 
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the greatest threat to children in modern liberal societies is not that they will 
believe in something too deeply, but that they will believe in nothing very deeply 
at all.  Even to achieve the kind of free self-reflection that many liberals prize, it is 
better to begin by believing something.  Rational deliberation among ways of life 
is far more meaningful if (and I am tempted to say only if) the stakes are 
meaningful, that is, if the deliberator has strong convictions against which 
competing claims can be weighed.  The role of parents in fostering such 
convictions should be welcomed not feared.78 
At base for Galston, a moral culture of strong individual beliefs is necessary in a good 
liberal democratic system; the capacity for strong and informed political participation is 
less important. 
The exact contours of the line of demarcation between the prerogatives of the 
state and the rights of individual citizens in a liberal system cannot be determined as if it 
were an abstract math problem, unaffected by the particular political context and 
community at issue.  Where exactly the line should be drawn instead depends in some 
large part on the characteristics of the particular polity at issue – including such 
considerations as how diverse the populace is, how polarized it is in its beliefs, and how 
likely citizens are to learn important civic virtues without the assistance of the state.  
Measured in light of current conditions, Galston in my view gets this balance terribly 
wrong. The events of the past few years have shown us that the contemporary threat to 
liberal democracy in the United States is not that citizens will believe too little, but rather 
that an uninformed and illiberal citizenry will erode individual rights and fail to call the 
undemocratic impulses of the government to account.  Indeed, the events of the past few 
years represent in many respects the unhappy realization of Galston’s straitened vision of 
civic education.    
 
78 GALSTON , supra note 28, at 255. 
35
Our citizenry’s risk is not in their absence of strong beliefs.  Rather, their 
weakness from the point of view of liberal democracy is that these strong beliefs have 
little to do with support for liberal democratic principles and institutions, including the 
separation of church and state, a free press, and the rule of law – all of which are on 
increasingly shaky foundations of citizens’ support.  At a time in which only about half of 
America's high school students think newspapers should be allowed to publish freely 
without government approval of their stories, and a third say the free speech guarantees 
of the First Amendment go "too far", this is no mere academic debate.79 And at a time in 
which the great majority of citizens are more religious than in other industrialized 
countries, higher percentages believe that religious leaders should assume a strong 
political role than in other countries, and a number of these leaders advocate positions 
based on illiberal grounds,80 the strength of this liberal democracy does not depend on 
strengthening citizens’ comprehensive commitments, but on strengthening their 
commitment to liberal democratic principles.81 Further, at a time in which citizens lack 
 
79 A recent study by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation's High School Initiative, found 
startlingly little support for, and even less appreciation of, basic First Amendment guarantees.  See THE 
JOHN S. AND JAMES L. KNIGHT FOUNDATION, FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: KEY FINDINGS (2005), 
available at http://firstamendment.jideas.org/downloads/future_ch1.pdf (last visited March 17, 2006).  The 
study found that nearly three-quarters of high school students said either that they don’t know how they feel 
about the First Amendment, or that they take it for granted.  Id. at 5.  Students lack knowledge about 
fundamental aspects of the First Amendment: seventy-five percent believe that flag burning is illegal; 
almost half believe that the government can restrict indecent material on the Internet.  Id. at 7.  See also 
Bob Herbert, Editorial, Our Battered Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, at A19 (summarizing results 
of Knight Foundation's High School Initiative). 
 
80 See supra note 58.   
81 A recent survey across several nations found that nearly all U.S. respondents said faith is important to 
them, a far higher percentage than in other countries.  Only 2 percent of Americans said they do not believe 
in God. Almost 40 percent said religious leaders should try to sway policymakers, notably higher than in 
other countries.  Will Lester, Religion More Key in U.S., Poll Finds , OCREGISTER.COM (June 7, 2005), 
available at http://ocregister.com/ocr/2005/06/07/sections/nation_world/nation_world/article_549497.php
(last visited May 1, 2006).   
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basic knowledge on major policy issues,82 being able to think critically and evaluate 
evidence and arguments are crucial skills necessary for the perpetuation of a democracy 
that truly serves the interests of its people.    
 Galston is certainly right that we should seek to guard against the risk of 
becoming a nation of citizens with few morals and fewer ideals.  We must also, however, 
guard against becoming a nation in which few have the interest or capacity to actively 
engage in public affairs and to help determine collectively the future of the polity.  In the 
United States, where belief in God and association with organized religion is higher than 
in any other industrialized country,83 but in which voting participation and voter’s 
knowledge is extremely low, the risk of disinterest and inability to engage competently in 
public affairs seems significantly higher than the risk of having few strong 
comprehensive views.  While Galston seeks to mediate between an inclusive liberalism 
that can support strong moral views and a liberalism that ensures a vigorous democratic 
polity, the elements of his theory ultimately risk the vibrant liberal democracy for which 
he strives. 
III. Reconciling the Interests at Stake  
 
But if these theories regarding the proper scope of civic education fail to balance 
adequately the range of important interests at stake in civic education, what is the 
alternative?  In this section, I develop an approach to civic education that, I argue, 
reaches a better accommodation among the complex values at stake in a liberal 
 
82 See Paul Krugman, Reign of Error, N. Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at A 29 (discussing recent Harris Poll, in 
which 50% of Americans incorrectly answered that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction at the time 
the U.S. invaded; meanwhile, 64 percent still believe that Saddam had strong links with Al Qaeda).   
 
83 See supra note 81.
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democracy than do those I have discussed.  To do this, in the first part of this section, I 
begin by scrutinizing the varied range of interests legitimately entitled to consideration in 
a liberal democracy.  A nuanced consideration of these interests, I argue, helps to 
ameliorate some of what seems, at first glance, to be tension among them.84 I then offer 
an approach that seeks an accommodation among these more-refined interests in a 
manner that offers parents’, childrens’, and the community’s interests due respect, but 
that also ensures that future citizens have the education to ensure the continuation of a 
vigorous liberal democracy. 
In formulating this approach, I build on the work of a number of liberal theorists, 
including John Rawls, himself,85 as well as recent liberal revisionists including Thomas 
Spragens and Stephen Macedo.86 These liberal revisionists recognize that a liberal 
democracy cannot flourish without paying close attention to ensuring the conditions 
necessary for its survival, including that its citizens have the necessary civic virtues.87 
The problem then becomes how to balance the civic education necessary for a flourishing 
liberal democracy against liberal and democratic goods and principles. 
 
84 In making this argument, I am following in the footsteps of Thomas Spragens, supra note 28, who 
argues that a more nuanced conception of the goods at stake in liberal democratic theory generally permits 
a richer notion of liberalism capable of encompassing a broader range of goods; see also MACEDO, supra 
note 28. 
 
85 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
 
86 See WILLIAM GALSTON, supra note 28; STEPHEN  MACEDO, supra note 28; STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL 
VIRTUES (1990); THOMAS SPRAGENS, supra note 28. 
87 See WILLIAM GALSTON, supra note 28, at 244-46; STEPHEN MACEDO, supra note 28, at 278; THOMAS 
SPRAGENS, supra note 28, at 126-30. 
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A.  Liberal Democratic Goods and Justifications  
 
The issues raised by civic education are so difficult because they implicate fault 
lines among important interests that go clear to the core of a liberal democracy.  One way 
to map out these tensions conceptually is to think of the relevant values as occupying the 
space of a triangle in which each corner represents a different, legitimate source of 
authority in a liberal democracy: liberal, democratic, and civic.  In this schematization, 
the liberal corner prioritizes those goods relating to individual rights and self-
determination that have been given pride of place in the liberal tradition.  The democratic 
corner, by contrast, focuses on the moral legitimacy of majoritarian self-rule.  In this 
corner, the will of the people is entitled to weight in children’s education because it 
legitimately governs the polity of which these children are members.  Finally, the third 
corner recognizes the civic virtues that are required by citizens to perform the difficult 
task of self-government in a liberal democracy.  Insofar as we consider liberal democracy 
a morally worthy form of government, supporting the qualities necessary to perpetuate it 
is justifiable whether or not these qualities would be justified independently by liberal 
values or the will of the democratic majority.88 
88 No doubt there is significant overlap between these civic virtues of the third corner of the triangle and 
qualities that would be supported by the other corners.  For example, the development of children’s 
autonomy, which would be supported by the liberal corner, would also be supported as a civic virtue 
important in a liberal democracy.   Nevertheless, other civic virtues, such as respect for democratic 
procedures, that might not be justified in other corners (assuming, for example, that the majority did not 
agree to teaching such respect), are justified independently here.    
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I do not want to make great claims for the congruence of these three categories:89 
obviously their status varies greatly – both the liberal and civic corners emphasize 
particular goods and virtues, while the democratic corner contains no definitive content, 
but instead gives justification to whatever the body of citizens decide.  With that said, 
each corner marks a legitimate source of justification in a liberal democracy to which 
attention must be paid with respect to civic education.  It is the tensions among the goods 
and interests associated with each of these corners that make the issue of civic education 
such a difficult one.  I discuss each corner in turn. 
 
Liberal goods  
 Considering the liberal corner first, given the primacy of liberalism in the 
American world-view,90 it is unsurprising that liberal goods are most often discussed with 
reference to civic education.  In particular, it is the good of autonomy, traditionally 
accorded pride of place in liberal theory, on which theoretical discussions of civic 
education generally focus.  Specifically, this good of autonomy is generally framed in 
terms of parents’ liberty interest to raise their children in accordance with their own 
religious beliefs and views of the good life.  Conceived in this light, liberalism’s respect 
 
89 There are a number of shortcomings to mapping the debate on civic education in this way.  Some 
qualities, such as children being able to make informed decisions about different ways of life, potentially 
fall into both the liberal (based on furthering the autonomy of children) and civic (based on the polity’s 
functioning better when citizens are able to deliberate) corners of the triangle.  In addition, it could be 
argued that liberalism itself both should and historically did incorporate the values associated with a strong 
civic realm.  See WILLIAM GALSTON, supra note 28; STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC 
EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 28; THOMAS SPRAGENS, supra note 28. With 
that said, it seems to me that conceptualizing the issue of civic education in terms of these three distinct 
areas helps to highlight the tension among and within these different areas – tensions that are too often 
glossed over in discussions of civic education.   
 
90 See, e.g., LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1991). 
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for autonomy calls, as Stephen Gilles argues for broad parental authority over children’s 
education. 
Yet, although autonomy is generally cited as a reason to accord parents’ broad 
control of children’s education, does not, on further reflection, dictate this policy 
outcome.  As Bruce Ackerman’s work makes clear,91 parents are not the only ones whose 
autonomy interests are at stake:  Children too, have autonomy interests implicated in 
civic education relating to their developing their ability to choose their own life paths.  
Furthermore, in the context of civic education, children’s interest in acquiring the 
capacity for autonomy may conflict with parents’ exercise of autonomy.  This is the case 
when parents’ views of the good life, as they did in Yoder and Mozert, favor preventing 
children from developing the capacity to think and make life decisions for themselves.92 
In such cases, while the parents’ autonomy interests would favor a confined role for the 
state, the children’s autonomy interests would instead favor state involvement to insure 
that children develop the capacity to choose their own course in life. 
 Three specific propositions relating to autonomy’s application to children emerge 
from considering how this value can be reconciled with the other values in the liberal-
democratic pantheon when it comes to civic education.  First, children must be provided 
with the resources necessary to achieve at least a basic level of autonomy, in the sense 
that they become capable of making basic decisions about the conduct of their own lives.  
The fundamental importance that liberal democracy attaches to self-determination would 
be meaningless in the absence of children achieving at least the level of capacity for 
 
91 See ACKERMAN supra note 30. 
 
92 LINDA MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 
(2005). 
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autonomy at which they possess sufficient information and skills to live on their own in 
the world.  It is true, as William Galston points out, that liberalism’s respect for the life 
plans of others means that unexamined life plans need to be respected as much as plans 
that are arrived at rationally.  However, this does not lead to parents being able to deprive 
children of developing the capacity for self-determination.  The concept of moral 
personhood on which liberal democracy rests does not allow one person to serve simply 
as a pawn to satisfy another person’s life plan, even when the other person is a parent.  
This interest in acquiring the basic skills needed to develop a life plan is so fundamental 
to liberalism’s respect for individuals that it may not be sacrificed to other interests.   
Second, as Thomas Spragens points out, 93 autonomy is not a good that a liberal 
democracy properly seeks to maximize.  We value autonomy as an intrinsic element in a 
fully human life, yet a life spent pursuing as much autonomy as possible would be 
destructive because it would erase our ties with others and our situatedness.  Instead, 
autonomy is better conceptualized as a good for which there exists some optimal level.  
Over and this optimal level, more autonomy is not necessarily better.   
Third, and finally, as Bruce Ackerman recognizes, children’s capacity for 
developing and exercising autonomy increases as they grow toward adulthood.  We 
would therefore expect a toddler to have far less of a capacity for autonomy than a 
teenager.  Thus, insofar as a liberal democracy has the obligation to ensure the 
development of its young citizens’ capacity for autonomy, the state’s obligation to 
expand that capacity requires more for older children than younger children.     
 
93 See SPRAGENS, supra note 28, at 127. 
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Turning from children’s autonomy interests to those of their parents, a nuanced 
account of parents’ legitimate interest in passing on their way of life to their children 
should also recognize several different propositions.  First, this interest can never be 
given absolute sway:  parents’ complete control of children’s education is abhorrent to 
the notion at the heart of liberalism that individuals must be, on some basic level, capable 
of self-determination.  Second, parents’ interest in passing along their ways of life is 
strongest when it comes to what John Rawls called “comprehensive” conceptions of the 
good life – those beliefs that are part of an all-encompassing conception of the good life.  
In contrast, parents’ interests are weaker when it comes to passing along political virtues, 
which liberalism has historically treated as at least partly the job of the public domain.  
Third, and finally, parents’ legitimate interests in determining their children’s education 
diminish to some extent as their children approach maturity and become more of their 
own persons capable of exercising autonomy, as well as closer to assuming their own 
place as citizens in the polity. 
 
Democratic goods 
But we are not only a liberal polity, we are also a democracy.  The claim to 
legitimacy of collective self-rule therefore provides an alternative source of justification 
through which the issue of civic education must be analyzed.  We give decisions of a 
democracy moral weight because all citizens have a voice in the collective affairs of the 
group.94 The determinations of a democracy therefore are an independent source of 
 
94 See AMY GUTMANN, supra note supra note 28, at 11 (stating that the benefit of a democracy is that it 
makes a “virtue out of our inevitable disagreement,” and positing that “the policies that result from 
democratic deliberations . . . will be more enlightened by the values and concerns of the many communities 
that constitute a democracy”).   
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moral justification apart from the liberal tradition.  And the fact that children are not only 
members of their families but also citizens of the polity means that the polity, like their 
families, has a legitimate claim to direct their education.95 Focusing on the moral 
authority of democracy therefore militates in favor of the state having broad authority 
regarding children’s education, although it does not, in contrast to the liberal corner, 
suggest any particular content of that education.   
The legitimate scope of the democratic interests at stake have not been theorized 
to the same extent that the liberal interests have; this is because, as Sheldon Wolin writes 
of Rawls’ work, our tradition has tended to demote democracy to the subaltern position 
relative to liberalism.96 Yet we can discern several things about democracy’s position 
relative to liberalism that help to define its role.  First, if children truly are to be 
considered as members of the political community as well as the family, the political 
community should have some say over children’s education.  Second, the polity’s interest 
should increase as children mature and prepare to enter the political community.   
Third, and finally, a democracy’s legitimate interest in children’s education in a 
liberal system may not extend, in John Rawls’ terminology, to teaching a 
“comprehensive” account of the truth, in other words, a complete account of truth as a 
whole.   As Rawls points out, our world is characterized by a deep diversity of religious 
and philosophical views.  For some, truth and the good life are defined by the Bible’s 
dictates and fundamentalist Christian ideals.  For others, they are defined by a 
comprehensive liberal account that sees freedom as the highest goods.  What’s more, we 
 
95 See id.
96 See Sheldon Wolin, The Liberal/Democratic Divide: On Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 24 POLIT.
THEORY, Feb. 1996, at 97. 
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have no mutually accessible standards by which these different comprehensive views can 
be adjudicated.   
Yet as Rawls argues, in conditions of deep diversity, government is still justifiable 
when it is grounded on reasons that those from differing comprehensive philosophies can 
accept – what Rawls calls “public reason.”  This mode of justification, in Stephen 
Macedo’s words, “would put aside the many religious and philosophical questions about 
which people have long differed and instead attempt to justify the most basic matters of 
justice on grounds widely acceptable to reasonable people – and not only to those who 
share our particular view of the truth.”97 The government, in this view, has not business 
teaching comprehensive doctrines, but must confine itself to those doctrines that can be 
justified based on this “overlapping consensus.”   On this reasoning, schools can teach 
doctrines supported by scientific evidence, for example, but not those supported only by 
the Bible.  And while schools may teach children civil and political virtues, they may not 
teach them comprehensive virtues for this same reason98 Thus schools can teach children 
that political autonomy is a noble virtue, but not that the exercise of autonomy in their 
religious lives is the same. 
 
Civic virtues 
Finally, in the last corner of the triangle are civic virtues – those virtues that 
citizens must possess if the polity is to function well.  While traditionally liberal theorists 
paid little attention to the virtues needed for a liberal democracy to thrive, this lack of 
attention has been redressed in recent years.  Liberal theory’s renewed focus on civic 
 
97 See MACEDO, supra note 28, at 168. 
 
98 See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 4 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (H. Tozer trans., 3d ed. 1948). 
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republicanism has acted as an important corrective on liberal theory, as preeminent 
liberal theorists have increasingly recognized the importance to a well-functioning liberal 
democracy of its citizenry possessing civic virtues.99 They have differed with one 
another, however, regarding both the content of civic virtues and the extent to which the 
state may promote them when they interfere with citizens’ autonomy. 
 What can we say about how civic virtues should be conceptualized in a normative 
theory that seeks to combine these virtues with other, competing goods and interests?  
One thing that should be clear is that, insofar as a liberal democratic government is 
conceived as preferable to other possible government forms, both because it allows 
individuals a considerable amount of individual freedom as well as the freedom to 
collectively determine their future, it must be able to perpetuate itself.100 Accordingly, 
both citizens and democracy itself must properly surrender at least the amount of liberty 
necessary to ensure the continuation of the polity.  This means that parents and the state 
must sacrifice at least the amount of control over children needed to instill enough civic 
virtue in the next generation so that it can continue.  Over and above this level, however, 
how civic virtues should be combined with other goods is much less clear. 
 
B.  Reconciling the Goods and Interests 
 
So where does this leave us in terms of delineating a framework for assessing the 
legitimacy of civic education programs?  To begin with, I have identified two hard and 
fast obligations that must be satisfied with respect to civic education before other 
 
99 See, e.g., GALSTON, supra note 89; Amy Gutmann, Undemocratic Education, in LIBERALISM AND THE 
MORAL LIFE (1989); SPRAGENS, supra note 89; STEPHEN MACEDO, Liberal Civic Education and Religious 
Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls, 105(3) ETHICS 487 (1995). 
 
100 See GALSTON, supra note 89. 
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interests are considered.  First, children must be provided with the education necessary to 
achieve at least a basic level of autonomy, regardless of what the majority prefers or their 
parents desire.  Without this, liberal democracy’s fundamental respect for individual 
dignity and self-determination means nothing.  Second, children must be encouraged to 
develop sufficient civic virtues necessary to perpetuate a liberal democracy.   This means 
that parents must yield to civic education programs necessary to achieve these qualities, 
even when they conflict with parents’ fundamental beliefs.  Furthermore, the state has the 
responsibility to provide this basic education even over parents’ objections. 
 Over and above these two basic prerequisites, political liberalism gives us two 
more limits on civic education.   Schools must confine their education to lessons that can 
be justified by public reason, as opposed to comprehensive rationales.   Further, they 
must confine the scope of their teaching to political doctrines rather than comprehensive 
doctrines.  Regardless of what the majority of a democracy desires with respect to 
children’s acculturation, this is, after all, a liberal democracy, which must therefore 
reserve a wide swath of freedom from the state.   Moreover, even with regard to teaching 
political virtues, the state’s power should not be used in the delicate area of shaping 
citizens’ preferences and characters without significant reasons for doing so, particularly 
in a manner opposed to parents’ comprehensive beliefs.    
 The remaining interests can best be accommodated, taking a leaf from Bruce 
Ackerman,101 by adopting a framework in which parents have declining, and the 
democracy has ascending, authority to educate students as they get older.  Both the 
interest that Ackerman calls attention to – the child’s interest in personal integrity – and 
 
101 ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 142-43. 
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the strong link between child and family in a child’s early years, suggest that although a 
democracy may institute the civic education necessary for a healthy liberal democratic 
polity, it should not go further than nurturing such important values and virtues during 
the child’s primary education.  At this time, parents’ influence over their children and 
their interest in inculcating their children into their way of life are sufficient to outweigh 
any other interest of a democracy in stamping its imprimatur on its youngest citizens.  
This limit of civic minimalism also has the virtue of likely requiring the teaching of 
tenets that are less offensive to parents (although certainly some parents will still 
disagree), at a time when children are less likely to be able to sort out conflicts between 
their parents’ views and the views they learn at school.  For example, at this stage, while 
teaching children generally to respect others and exposing them to basic differences of 
religion is appropriate, the state should refrain at this age from going further than this.  
Exposing young children to significant differences in the content of these beliefs (as 
opposed to some basic differences in traditions or culture) would be inappropriate with 
young children.  At younger ages, schools should seek to limit the messages they convey 
to those central to the success of a liberal polity. 
 This does not mean, however, that the state should always be confined to 
Galston’s “civic minimalism,” in which the state can use civic education only to develop 
basic virtues necessary for the polity to function well. Instead, the importance of a 
healthy democratic polity that balances the value of a vibrant civic realm against the 
value of individual liberty, as well as the recognition that children are not only members 
of their families but also of the larger society, should give the state at least somewhat 
more leeway with respect to children’s education.  This is particularly true as children get 
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older and more capable of understanding different viewpoints as well as of making sense 
of the difference between parents’ and schools’ views.  At this point, children are also 
coming closer to becoming their own citizens in the democracy.  And the weight assigned 
parents’ interest in inculcating their way of life should decrease as children grow older.  
For these reasons, a civic liberal democracy should have more freedom to move beyond 
civic minimalism and to institute a wider sphere of democratic civic education as children 
mature.  Thus, as students move beyond the lower grades, the state may acquaint students 
with lessons that are substantially related to the polity’s ways of life beyond those strictly 
necessary for the liberal democratic polity to perpetuate itself.   
In contrast to the civic minimalist position appropriate when children are younger, 
this might be called the “civic medium” position.  Under it, in deciding what civic 
education older children should receive, the democracy should focus on those values at 
stake in the civic/liberal/democratic triangle, but should pay careful attention to those 
liberal values that traditionally have served as a check on the power of democracy.  
Because of the weight that must be paid to these liberal virtues, including individual 
autonomy and diversity, the state should never adopt a “civic maximalist” position with 
regard to civic education of the type that Gutmann would allow.  Further, because of the 
increasing autonomy and intellectual capacity of older children, the civic education 
provided to them is appropriately taught with more complexity; in teaching more 
controversial proposals, a school should present the issues in a way that allows students 
themselves to work through the issues. This means that schools can go appreciably 
further in communicating virtues and values to students in high school than they might 
when students are younger.  For example, while purely private morality should never be 
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taught in public schools, a school might seek to convey to older students information 
about birth control, sexuality, and disease prevention, in order to foster legitimate public 
goals, even if such material would not be appropriate for younger children.  Education 
regarding the morality of particular sexual practices, however, such as premarital sex, 
masturbation, and birth control, must be left to parents. 
Under this proposal, some parents’ efforts to pass along their beliefs and ways of 
life will be disadvantaged by their children’s exposure to other ways of life, to lessons of 
political tolerance of groups disapproved of by their parents, or by teaching children to 
reason about their future.  As Stephen Macedo argues, however, the promise of liberal 
democracy is that it will not prohibit citizens from holding or communicating a wide 
variety of beliefs, including illiberal and undemocratic beliefs.  It does not promise, 
however, that all such beliefs will be given a level playing field by the state, in the sense 
that the state will forgo furthering its legitimate objectives to avoid disadvantaging these 
beliefs.102 
C. Difficult Issues: Sex Education 
One particularly difficult issue on which parents’, children’s, and the state’s 
interests sometimes clash concerns the issue of sex education.  Issues surrounding sexual 
conduct are central to the religious beliefs and the comprehensive philosophies of many 
citizens, who regard passing on these views to the children as central to their parental 
prerogatives.  Should schools avoid teaching sex education for this reason?  Or should 
schools allow an opt-out mechanism for those students whose parents object, as Amy 
Gutmann suggests? 
 
102 MACEDO, supra note 28, at 219.  
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In my view, the answer is “no” to both of these questions, at least insofar as it 
involved teaching children the basic risks associated with sexual activity, as well as the 
basic facts of birth control.  Despite the integral role that sexual prohibitions play in the 
religious and comprehensive philosophies of many parents, sex education is central to 
young citizens’ capacity for autonomy.  As I argued before, schools have a responsibility 
to provide children the education needed to develop their capacity for autonomy that the 
state cannot waive, even if parents object.  Schools’ obligation to develop students’ basic 
capacity for autonomy includes ensuring that they have the basic knowledge to 
understand and control their reproductive capacities.  While this knowledge is important 
to youths of both sexes, it is particularly important to young women, whose life prospects 
are, even more than men, irrevocably altered by the birth of a child. 
The federal government’s current emphasis on abstinence only sex education, 
funded in the welfare reform package, does not meet the state’s responsibility in this 
regard.103 As Linda McClain argues, an overwhelming amount of evidence suggests that 
abstinence-only education does not provide minors the information they need to protect 
their reproductive health.  In fact, the Union of Concerned Scientists cited the 
government’s support of abstinence-only education as an example of “distorting scientific 
knowledge on reproductive health issues.”104 It could be argued, of course, that 
 
103 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (approving 
funding for sex education programs that “abstinence from sexual activity outside marriage is the expected 
standard for all school age children.”). 
 
104 MCCLAIN, supra note 28, at 178-99.  
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educating youths about contraception will increase teen sexual activity.  As Linda 
McClain argues, however, reliable studies have not borne this out.105 
Several caveats accompany the school’s obligation to teach sex education, 
however.  Most important, this does not mean that schools have any business offering 
comprehensive views regarding sexual conduct to students.  They have no business 
suggesting to children, for example, that premarital sexual conduct or masturbation is an 
appropriate part of growing up.  Comprehensive issues such as the propriety and morality 
of sexual conduct are for parents, not schools.  And schools’ building children’s capacity 
for sexual autonomy does not mean that students must or will choose to exercise that 
capacity.  Students may view particular religious strictures as barring their sexual conduct 
and therefore see themselves as not having the choice to exercise their capacity.  Finally, 
the fact that schools have the obligation to develop this capacity does not mean that 
parents may not forbid their children from exercising this capacity when they are minors:  
Parents are completely within their rights to deny their children the opportunity to 
exercise their reproductive capacities while their children are minors.  Yet the state must 
still ensure that students have at least the capacity to control their reproductive future and 
health.  
 
D. Revisiting Challenged School Programs 
How do the requirements challenged in Yoder, Mozert, and the cases that 
followed them fare under the approach that I advocate here?  In Yoder, in my framework, 
 
105 See id. at 184; see also Broadsheet: 65 Pregnant Teens= One Canceled Abstinence Only Program,
SALON, Aug. 17, 2006 (available online at 
http://www.salon.com/mwt/broadsheet/2006/08/17/Ohio/index.html) (Canton, Ohio School Board adds sex 
education to its abstinence-only curriculum after discovering that 65 of 490 high school girls –13% of 
Timken High School’s female population – were pregnant.) 
52
the Court reached the wrong conclusion.  The contested mandate that children stay in 
high school until age sixteen sought to prepare them to participate effectively in the 
liberal democratic system, as well as to be self-sufficient participants in society.  Both of 
these interests are substantially related to the success of a liberal polity, and are political 
rather than comprehensive virtues.  The parents’ arguments that their children didn’t need 
to participate effectively in the larger political system or society, since Amish society 
remained aloof from these larger systems, are unavailing in this framework.  The state 
has the obligation to ensure that children achieve a basic capacity to make their own life 
decisions and to participate in society.  The children may later decide not to exercise this 
capacity; but an adult cannot make this decision for them. 
The fact that the requirement applies to older children also weighs in the state’s 
favor. In this context, the fact that older children are more cognizant of differences and 
different ways of life supports, rather than detracts (as the Yoder parents would have it), 
from the law’s permissibility.  These children are capable of more complex 
understanding of differences and of greater autonomy than young children; both of these 
capabilities lessen parents’ legitimate realm of control over their children.  Further, the 
challenged requirement occurs at the period in which the state’s interests in children’s 
civic education is at its highest since the children at issue will soon be voting citizens 
entrusted with shaping the future of the polity.   
In fact, the relationship between school attendance and the health of the polity 
should be justifiable even under a civic minimalist rationale, which I have argued is a 
higher standard that the state should have to meet for older children.  Citizens who have 
little understanding of diversity because they have had little exposure to it, and indeed, 
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little understanding of ways of life apart from their own, are ill-equipped to elect 
representatives charged with forging a common path among citizens.  The fact that the 
Amish plaintiffs did not choose that their children take any kind of active place in the 
polity does not give these parents the right to exempt these children from these 
requirements.  To deprive children of the basic tools needed to participate in society 
beyond the role that their parents have chosen for them violates both the absolute 
requirement that children should be able to develop the basic preconditions for autonomy 
and the state’s responsibility to ensure that children have the capacity to become 
responsible citizens who are up to the difficult task of collective self-government.   This 
makes the Yoder situation an easy case: the requirement that children attend school until 
age sixteen should be upheld. 
Mozert,106 the case that challenged the series of readers used in primary school, is 
a harder case under my framework. The contested Holt readers used in the first to eighth 
grades in the Hawkins County School System were part of a comprehensive “critical 
reading program.” which sought to integrate the ideas and themes from the textbooks into 
other areas of study.  As defined by the Court, “critical reading requires the development 
of higher order cognitive skills that that enable students to evaluate the material they 
read, to contrast the ideas presented, and to understand complex characters that appear in 
the reading material.”107 Under my framework, because the children involved were 
younger students, the school needed to establish that it had an important state interest to 
justify exposing children to civic education that violates their parents’ strongly held 
 
106 Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 
107 Id. at 1060.  
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beliefs.  Here, parents objected in some large part to their children’s being exposed in a 
non-derogatory way to cultures, values, and ways of life that their fundamentalist faith 
prohibited. 
The exposure of students to the fact of other religions and other ways of life is 
certainly an important part of training students for life in a diverse liberal democracy.   
As I argued before in responding to William Galston,108 students can only understand 
what peaceful coexistence in a society marked by profound differences really means if 
they are exposed on at least some level to these profound differences.  This does not 
mean that the state may advocate any particular comprehensive way of life.  The simple 
depiction of different ways of life in a non-derogatory manner, however, does not 
constitute such advocacy.  This is the case even if it may have, as the parents feared, 
some negative effect on fundamentalist beliefs.109 This conclusion holds, however, only 
assuming that the readers exposed students to the basic outlines of the differences in 
culture and religious practices, rather than dwelt on substantive differences in religious 
beliefs.  Such a more detailed discussion of different religions may be appropriate for 
older children (assuming, of course, that is not accompanied by messages about the 
correctness of any of these religions), but not younger children, since it cannot be 
justified by the requirement of civic minimalism. 
Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, by contrast, is a relatively easy case 
for finding the program presented at the school assembly to be illegitimate.  While the 
 
108 See supra at pp. 30-36.   
 
109 As I argued earlier, based on the fine work of Stephen Macedo, the state has an obligation not to 
advocate any particular comprehensive vision of the good life; it need not withdraw from defending its 
legitimate civil interests to ensure that comprehensive beliefs have an even playing field.  See supra at p. 
49; see also STEPHEN MACEDO, supra note 28, at 291. 
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state has an interest in communicating information to students about AIDS and 
alternatives to unprotected sex (given the link between children’s sexual behavior and the 
state’s legitimate public health goals), the way in which the message was conveyed to 
students, including asking a student to demonstrate his “orgasm face,” also strongly 
conveyed a message of approval of premarital sex.  The state has no business teaching 
such a comprehensive belief.  The fact that the education was directed at older students 
therefore does not save this program.  The challenged program fails. 
The community service requirement challenged in Immediato falls at the opposite 
end of the spectrum.  Teaching its future citizens the importance of civic contributions 
falls squarely into the basic virtues necessary for a liberal democracy, premised on self-
rule, to function well.  As the school board argued, requiring students to perform 
community service “would expose students to the needs of their communities and to the 
various ways in which a democratic system of volunteerism can respond to those 
needs.”110 Furthermore, it “helps students recognize their place in their communities and 
ideally, inspires them to introspection regarding their larger role in our political 
system.”111 This requirement would be permissible under the civic minimalist standard 
applicable to younger children, and would therefore certainly be acceptable under the 
more lenient standard to justify educational programs for older children.   
This leaves only the health education classes challenged in Leebaert,112 which 
included information on human growth and development, disease prevention, community 
and consumer health, physical, mental and emotional health, including youth suicide 
 
110 Immediato v. Rye Neck School District, 73 F.3d 454, 462 (2nd Cir. 1996) 
111 Id. at 462.  
 
112 Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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prevention, substance abuse prevention, safety, and accident prevention.113 Under my 
analysis, the father’s basic position, that “God has empowered human beings with the 
right to bring their children up with correct moral principles in dealing with the issues 
taught in this course,”114 fails.  While parents certainly have the authority to teach their 
children moral principles relating to these subjects at home, the state also has a parallel 
authority to teach these issues at school.  In doing so, the state may not teach children a 
morality that rests on religion for its authority, but it can teach a morality derived from 
public reason akin to the golden rule.   
The one slightly grey area with respect to the program challenged in Leebaert 
concerned the age of the children involved – seventh grade.  These students therefore fall 
between the primary graders, for whom civic education must be justified based on civic 
minimalism, and the high schoolers, for whom a lesser test is required.  Given the strong 
relationship between the health of citizens and the success of the polity, though, even if 
this end doesn’t quite meet the requirement of civic minimalism, it comes close.  It 
therefore, on balance, should be allowed for students past the elementary grades.    
 
IV.  Constitutional Doctrine 
 
The approach to civic education that I have developed so far can be summarized 
as follows:  The state must, whatever else it does, ensure that children both (a) develop 
the capacity for a threshold level of autonomy that, if they exercised it, would allow them 
to make important decisions on their own; and (b) develop sufficient civic virtues 
necessary to perpetuate a liberal democracy.  In addition, the state must confine civic 
 
113 Id. The program also included a family life education program that included units on family life and 
family planning, but allowed students to waive participation in that program.  Id. at 135-36. 
 
114 Id. at 138. 
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education to teaching political rather than comprehensive doctrines, and must justify its 
actions based on public reason rather than comprehensive rationales.  Finally, the 
legitimate scope of civic education increases as children grow older.  For younger 
children, the state may go no further than perpetuate a healthy liberal democracy – what 
William Galston refers to as “civic minimalism.”115 As children mature, however, the 
state may provide a wider scope of lessons: those that have a substantial relationship to 
its health or character, even if they are not integrally tied to the polity’s functioning well.   
 I have arrived at this framework through an approach that considers the ideals that 
underlie liberal democracy, rather than through any sort of constitutional interpretation.  
This methodology therefore gives me no claim that this framework is supported – much 
less compelled – as a matter of existing constitutional law.  Nevertheless, although my 
project centers on theory rather than law, in this last section I want to at least briefly 
sketch out how this approach might be translated into constitutional doctrine.  My 
purpose in this section is to argue that current constitutional law can indeed be interpreted 
to comport with this approach.   
 Courts have traditionally analyzed challenges to educational programs under two 
different constitutional provisions: the due process clause, based on parents’ liberty 
interest in raising their children; and the free exercise clause, based on the claim that the 
state has violated parents’ (and sometimes students’) rights to exercise their religion.  
Free exercise clause challenges used to receive a higher level of scrutiny because of the 
special protection that the Constitution provides to religion, although since the Supreme 
 
115 Although, as I noted earlier, I would be inclined to read what is necessary to perpetuate the polity and 
core liberal democratic values more broadly than other scholars.  See supra at pp. 30-36. 
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Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,116 the standard of scrutiny 
applied to claims involving religion is less clear.117 Because the theoretical approach I 
have laid out so far treats objections to school programs to the same level of scrutiny 
regardless of whether the objections are rooted in religion or parenting philosophy, 
harmonizing legal doctrine with my theory requires that both types of constitutional 
challenges result in similar outcomes.  While this is certainly not compelled by current 
doctrine, neither is it inconsistent with it.  I discuss each cause of action in turn. 
Substantive due process analysis 
The two earliest cases that explicate the boundaries of parental authority over 
children’s education, Meyer v. Nebraska,118 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,119 establish 
the framework for analyzing the legitimacy of public school incursions on parents’ liberty 
interests.  In Meyer, the Court struck down a state law forbidding instruction in certain 
foreign languages, in part because it interfered with the right of parents to procure such 
instruction for their children.120 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:  
 
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty 
[guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment], the 
term has received much consideration and some of the included things 
have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom 
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to 
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up children, to 
 
116 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 
117 See infra at pp. 64-66. 
 
118 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  
 
119 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 
120 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.     
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worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and 
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.121 
Two years later, the Court in Pierce struck down a state statute requiring public 
school attendance, which therefore precluded attendance at parochial schools, 
because it "unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents or guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control."122 
The theoretical approach that I set out in Part III calls for something 
approximating an intermediate level of scrutiny (ranging from higher when 
children are younger, to lower when they mature).  Can the Meyer/Pierce standard 
comport with this level of scrutiny?  While some language in these opinions may 
appear to suggest that the Court applied a scrutiny akin to contemporary rational 
basis scrutiny, this is actually not as clear as it may at first seem.  Both Meyer and 
Pierce were decided before the development of the Court’s modern demarcation 
of levels of scrutiny in substantive due process law. 123 The Meyer and Pierce 
opinions certainly make it clear that the Meyer and Pierce Court applied a more 
deferential standard than the current strict scrutiny test.  In its words, “the 
established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise 
of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without 
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to 
 
121 Id. at 399. 
 
122 268 U.S. at 534-35. 
 
123 Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, 68 F.3d at 533; see also Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. 
Supp. 106, 136 (N.D. N.Y. 1988) (The degree of judicial scrutiny to be applied to a governmental action 
that interferes with the privacy interests recognized in Pierce and Meyer. . . is not clear to this court”). 
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effect."124 And, indeed, because of this language, a number of courts have applied 
a deferential standard of rational basis review.125 
Yet a closer look at the analysis in the Meyer and Pierce cases makes it 
clear that the Court applied a higher level of scrutiny than the contemporary, 
deferential rational basis standard.  In Meyer, the Court suggests that the 
challenged legislation prohibiting teaching of foreign languages in Nebraska to 
students who had not passed the eighth grade, served “a desirable end” insofar as 
it was designed to promote civic development through establishing a common 
culture.  It held however that the means adopted – the prohibition of language 
training – “exceed the limitations upon the power of the State . . . . No emergency 
has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some language other than 
English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent 
infringement of rights long freely enjoyed.”126 The Court’s analysis therefore 
demonstrates that it imposed a reasonability standard with real teeth, in which the 
Court carefully weighed the interest of the state as a concrete matter (rather than 
simply as an interest taken as an abstract matter) in the specific circumstances 
against the harm caused by the method selected by the state to further the interest.   
Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court struck down 
an Oregon statute requiring parents to send children between the ages of eight and 
 
124 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400; see also Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
 
125 See, e.g., Null v. Board of Education, 815 F. Supp. 937, 939 (parental liberty interest is a “general 
liberty interest subject to reasonable state regulation”); Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109, 112 (W.D. 
Mich. 1980) (parental liberty interest subject to reasonableness review rather than “compelling interest 
analysis); Jernigan v. State, 412 So.2d 1242, 1246 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (applying deferential 
reasonableness review). 
 
126 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403. 
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sixteen to public school.  In doing so, again, the Court did not dispute that the 
state had an interest in assuring that students received an adequate education that 
included “studies plainly essential to good citizenship.”127 Again, however, the 
Court subjected the means adopted to further this interest to a relatively searching 
scrutiny, holding that the interest did not justify the means chosen of 
“standardiz[ing] its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public 
teachers only.”128 Instead, in assessing the reasonability of the means chosen, the 
Court factored in the interest of the child’s parents, who “have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”129 
The murkiness surrounding the level of review in the parental rights cases 
in combination with the Supreme Courts’ recognition in these cases and 
elsewhere of the important interests of parents in raising their children as they see 
fit,130 justify courts’ imposition of a rational basis standard that has real teeth, 
which would comport with the theoretical approach I advocate.   To do so, courts 
should conduct a searching, rather than superficial, scrutiny of whether the state’s 
interest is reasonable, and it should deem unreasonable state programs that harm 
parents’ interests without an important reason for doing so.131 In this regard, a 
factor to which the court should accord significant weight in assessing the 
 
127 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.   
 
128 Id. at 535.    
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130 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (the “child is not the mere creature 
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”). 
 
131 See Tyll van Geel, Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other and Next Century: Citizenship 
Education and the Free Exercise of Religion, 34 Akron L. Rev. 293 (2000).  
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reasonability of the means chosen is the age of the children to whom the 
challenged educational requirement is directed.  Given the importance of the 
parental relationship to younger children, and their difficulty integrating vastly 
disparate belief systems at younger ages, it is unreasonable for the state to do 
more than what is necessary to teach core liberal democratic values at an early 
age.  As children mature, however, it is reasonable for the state to present a 
broader array of lessons.  Thus, for example, it is appropriate for children in 
primary grades to be aware of the fact of different religions and rudimentary 
differences in religious practices.  To acquaint them with detailed accounts of the 
differences in beliefs, themselves, however, should be deemed unreasonable.  In 
high school, however, it would be more legitimate to acquaint students with 
differences in belief systems.     
 Moving past the basic level of scrutiny, there are several features of the 
Meyer/Pierce approach that are an easy fit with my theoretical framework.  I have argued 
that the state must seek to enable children to develop a basic level of autonomy and the 
civic virtues necessary in a liberal democracy.  These state goals are clearly sufficiently 
important for judges to uphold under the scrutiny adopted in Meyer and Pierce. In 
addition, the Meyer/Pierce test comports easily with my approach’s limitation of civic 
education to teaching political virtues rather than comprehensive virtues, and its view that 
the state must justify its actions based on political rather than comprehensive rationales.  
These theoretical limits jibe well with the Meyer/Pierce test requirement that the state’s 
purpose be “within the competency of the state to effect.” All that is needed to translate 
political theory to legal doctrine here is to interpret comprehensive purposes and 
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viewpoints as excluded from the state’s legitimate realm of competence.  Thus, teaching 
children about sex education for the public purpose of preventing pregnancy should pass 
constitutional muster; however, teaching children that sex is better left until marriage 
because premarital sex is immoral should not: private morality is not within the 
competence of the state. 
 
Free exercise clause analysis 
The Supreme Court first set out the constitutional framework for challenges to 
school programs based on religion in Wisconsin v. Yoder.132 According to the Court, the 
special constitutional protection granted to free exercise of religion entitled this set of 
parental claims to heightened scrutiny: “[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined 
with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a 
‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state’ is required to 
sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”133 For a state 
program that violates parents’ religion to withstand challenge, there must be “a state 
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free 
Exercise Clause.”134 According to the Yoder court, the burden on the state is high: “the 
essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of 
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the 
free exercise of religion.”135 Put another way, parents’ rights to direct their children’s 
 
132 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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education trump even legitimate purposes of the state unless “harm to the physical or 
mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been 
demonstrated or may be properly inferred.”136 Furthermore, even if the state 
demonstrates a compelling purpose, it must still show that the means chosen are essential 
to achieving, or at least the least restrictive means of achieving that purpose.137 
Courts’ application of such a heightened standard to parents’ claim that school 
practices violates their religious rights has been complicated, however, by the Supreme 
Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith.138 In that case, the Court created 
a categorical rule that the rational basis standard should be applied to all free exercise 
claims challenging neutral, generally applicable laws that merely had incidental negative 
effects on religion. The Court reasoned that although the free exercise clause seeks to 
prevent government hostility against religious practices, it “does not relieve an individual 
of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the 
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes.)’”139 In doing so, however, the Court somewhat cryptically distinguished 
what it called a “hybrid situation,” which would except from rational basis review 
challenges in which the free exercise clause is asserted “in conjunction with other 
 
136 Id. at 230.   
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constitutional protections.”140 On the basis of this hybrid-rights theory, the Court 
distinguished cases such as Yoder, stating that they could still trigger heightened scrutiny 
on the ground that they involved both parental and free exercise rights. 
Since Smith, courts have been struggling to make sense of the hybrid-rights 
language and exception.141 While it is clear that rational basis scrutiny generally applies 
in most free exercise cases, the scope of any hybrid rights exception that remains, and 
whether any such exception should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny 
 
140 Id. at 881. 
 
141 In Justice Souter’s words in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993),  
 
The rule Smith announced . . . was decidedly untypical of the cases involving the same 
type of [formally neutral, generally applicable] law. Because Smith left those prior cases 
standing, we are left with a free-exercise jurisprudence in tension with itself, a tension 
that should be addressed, and that may legitimately be addressed, by reexamining the 
Smith rule in the next case that would turn upon its application. . . . In sum, it seems to 
me difficult to escape the conclusion that, whatever Smith's virtues, they do not include a 
comfortable fit with settled law. 
 
Id.  at 564 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter continued,  
 
Smith presents not the usual question of whether to follow a constitutional rule, but the 
question of which constitutional rule to follow, for Smith refrained from overruling prior 
free exercise cases that contain a free-exercise rule fundamentally at odds with the rule 
Smith declared. . . . The result is an intolerable tension in free-exercise law which may be 
resolved . . . in a case in which the tension is presented and its resolution pivotal. . . .  
Neutral, generally applicable laws, drafted as they are from the perspective of the non-
adherent, have the unavoidable potential of putting the believer to a choice between God 
and government. Our cases now present competing answers to the question when 
government, while pursuing secular ends, may compel disobedience to what one believes 
religion commands. 
 
Id. at  574, 577; see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 165 F.3d 692, 703 (9th Cir. 
1999)("The Supreme Court has been somewhat less than precise with regard to the nature of hybrid rights. . 
. . Perhaps not surprisingly in view of the Supreme Court's rather cryptic explanations, the courts of 
appeal[] have struggled to decipher Smith's hybrid-rights formula and have reached divergent conclusions 
as to exactly what constitutes a hybrid-rights claim."), rehearing granted, opinion withdrawn by, 192 F.3d 
1208, 1999 WL 965613 (1999); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207-1208 (9th Cir. 1999)(relying upon 
Thomas); Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998)("It 
is difficult to delineate the exact contours of the hybrid-rights theory discussed in Smith"). 
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is unclear.142 Lower federal courts have split on these issue.  Some have refused to 
recognize the hybrid-rights exception where parents contest school requirements based on 
both religion and parental liberty rights.143 Some have subjected these claims to an 
unspecified level of scrutiny.144 And others have continued to apply a compelling interest 
test.145 
As I have argued supra, with respect to substantive due process claims,146 
application of rational basis scrutiny can be harmonized with my theory, so long as courts 
use a rational basis standard that has real teeth.  Yet even strict scrutiny can be interpreted 
in a manner consistent with my approach, so long as courts interpret the requirement of a 
“compelling” state interest to include educational goals that are important to a flourishing 
liberal democratic polity, rather than only those that are absolutely necessary for the 
perpetuation of a liberal polity.  This view of the scope of interests that can be deemed 
“compelling” comports overwhelmingly with the way this requirement has been 
interpreted by courts. 147 The statement by the Yoder Court –  which represented the 
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v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D. Utah 1999);  Hicks v. Halifax County Board of Education, 93 F. Supp. 
2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999).  
 
146 See supra at pp. 58-63.   
 
147 See, e.g., Roman v Appleby, 558 F Supp. 449, 456, (holding that protection of public health is 
compelling state interest for purpose (E.D. Pa. 1983);  State v. Bontrager, 114 Ohio App. 3d 367 (1986) 
(requirement that hunter wear hunter orange was compelling state interest because clothing requirement 
bore a real and substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare; Pollock v. Marshall, 
656 F. Supp. 957 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (hair length requirements for prisoners furthered a compelling state 
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Court’s most deferential posture to parents’ religious claims that we have seen in recent 
years – that to satisfy the standard the state must show “harm  to the . . . public safety, 
peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred,148 without 
the requirement that the harm be to an interest necessary to perpetuate the polity, supports 
this interpretation. 
The second part of my approach – requiring that state laws seek to further 
comprehensive rather than political conceptions of the good – can be easily integrated 
into a heightened scrutiny analysis through courts striking down comprehensive goals as 
not compelling.149 The third part of my approach – a more lenient scrutiny of educational 
programs as children mature, ranging from accepting compelling programs for young 
children to important programs for older children – is somewhat more difficult to 
harmonize with the constitutional test, but still possible under requirement that the means 
chosen by the state be either necessary to pursue the state interest or the most restrictive 
means possible.  Courts amenable to my approach can consider the age at which children 
are exposed to programs to be a key factor that courts in determining the presence of 
necessity:  the argument here is that as students come closer to becoming full members of 
society it becomes more necessary for the state to take measures ensuring that they are 
adequately acculturated. 
 
interest because, among other things, longer hair has a greater tendency to clog sinks, showers and similar 
accommodations creating a sanitation problem).  
148 Id. at 406 U.S. at 230.   
 
149 Cf. Van Geel, at 363 (“An important implication of these ‘tests’ for assessing how compelling a state’s 
purpose is that they rule out as compelling the purpose of promoting a particular conception of ‘the good 
life.’”). 
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Conclusion 
Isaiah Berlin eloquently described the tradeoffs between satisfying competing 
claims of authority when he wrote that “[t]he world that we encounter in ordinary 
experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and 
claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the 
sacrifice of others.”150 I have argued that, when it comes to civic education, a healthy 
liberal democracy must do the delicate work of balancing a number of different claims of 
authority.  And because these sources of authority, at least sometimes, favor conflicting 
results, no neat, easy solution that satisfies all the relevant interests will always – perhaps, 
often – be possible.  That this is the case, however, is not reason to adopt a too-easy 
default in favor of only one of several important interests.  Instead, the importance of the 
interests at stake in civic education – the autonomy interests of both parents and children, 
the interests of the democracy in passing along its ways of life, and the interest of the 
polity in perpetuating vibrant citizenship – demand that we do the best we can to reach an 
accommodation among all of them. 
 
150 ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 18, 169 (1969). 
